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CIL Issues Resolution Report
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June, 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was provided by the Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment
using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206,
Instructions for Preparation o_ FMEA and CIL.
Subsystem FMEA/CIL assessments were completed as revised NASA and
prime contractor EMEA/CIL documentation became available. The
MDAC IOA task was brought to an interim conclusion in March,
1988. This resulted in several subsystem assessment reports
being published with open issues. Subsequent task authority was
received that allowed for the resolution of all remaining open
issues involving the critical items list.
This report contains IOA assessment worksheets showing resolution
of outstanding IOA CIL issues that were summarized in the IOA
FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report, dated 9 March 1988 (reference
70). Each assessment worksheet has been updated with CIL issue
resolution and rationale.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted NASA to readdress safety
policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the National
Space Transportation System (NSTS). MDAC is providing an
independent assessment of the proposed post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL
for completeness and technical accuracy.
The MDAC was initially tasked in June 1986 to conduct an
independent analysis and assessment on twenty subsystems.
Subsequently, in April 1987, eight additional subsystems were
added which provided complete coverage of all standard Orbiter
equipment. Table 2-1 provides a listing of the Orbiter and GFE
subsystems identified by NASA to the National Research Council,
Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit Committee.
Table 2-i
ORBITER AND GFE SUBSYSTEMS
ORIGINAL TWENTYSUBSYSTEMS (JUNE 1986)
o Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C)
o Data Processing System (DPS)
o Backup Flight System (BFS)
o Nose Wheel Steering (NWS)
o Instrumentation (INST)
o Electrical Power, Distribution & Control (EPD&C)
0 Main Propulsion System (MPS)
o Fuel Cell Powerplant (FCP)
o Power Reactant Supply & Distribution System (PRS&D)
o Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS)
o Reaction Control System (RCS)
o Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
o Hydraulics & Water Spray Boiler (HYD & WSB)
o Atmospheric Revitalization System (ARS)
o Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control
System (ARPCS)
0 Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU)
o Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU)
o Landing & Deceleration (L&D)
o Hydraulic Actuators (HA)
o Remote Manipulator System (RMS)
ADDITIONAL EIGHT SUBSYSTEMS (APRIL 1987)
o Communications and Tracking (C&T)
o Displays and Controls (D&C)
o Orbiter Experiments (OEX)
o Pyrotechnics (PYRO)
o Purge, Vent and Drain (PV&D)
o Mechanical Actuation System (MAS)
o Active Thermal Control System (ATCS), Life Support
System (LSS), and Airlock Support System (ALSS)
o Crew Equipment (CE)
The IOA analysis approach is summarized in the following steps
1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the assessment of the NASA
and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
I.I Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define Subsystem Analysis Diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure Events Definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA Analysis Data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
As a result of the preceding steps, general project assumptions
and ground rules (Appendix B) were developed to amplify and
clarify instructions in NSTS 22206. Also, subsystem specific
assumptions and ground rules were defined.
3.0 CIL ISSUES RESOLUTION WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
The IOA analysis process produced an initial total of 10,735
independently derived failure modes and 4,513 potential critical
items. As of 9 March 1988, when the Interim Report was published
(reference 70), a total of 3,193 FMEA issues and 1,637 CIL
assessment issues remained open due to a lack of revised
subsystem FMEA/CIL documentation to be assessed. Several
subsystems were still in the Rockwell FMEA/CIL revision process
during the first quarter of 1988. The IOA assessment results
were fully documented in separate subsystem reports (references
36 through 69) and summarized in the Interim Report.
Subsequently, MDAC received revised CIL documentation and was
able to resolve all CIL issues. Out of 1,693 CIL issues, NASA
accepted 304 recommendations and IOA withdrew 1,369 issues. As a
result, all issues with safety and mission implications were
resolved.
Appendix C includes the revised IOA assessment worksheets
reflecting the resolution of the open CIL issues. Resolution
rationale is presented in the "Remarks" section at the bottom of
each assessment worksheet.
3
The number of assessment worksheets differs in many cases from
the number of CIL issues shown in the FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim
Report. This difference stems from the fact that there is not
always a one-to-one correspondence of IOA failure modes to NASA
failure modes.
The following subsystems have been excluded from this report
since they had no outstanding CIL issues remaining at the time of
publication of the interim report.
o Fuel Cell Powerplant
o Hydraulic Actuators
o Displays and Controls
o Guidance, Navigation and Control
o Orbiter Experiments
o Auxiliary Power Unit
o Backup Flight System
o Electrical Power Distribution and Control
In addition, the Manned Maneuvering Unit was omitted. This was
due to NASA indefinitely deferring its review of the Manned
Maneuvering Unit FMEA/CIL.
4.0 CONCLUSIONS
This report, as a companion volume to the Independent Orbiter
Assessment Final Report, MDAC Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA88003-47,
dated 16 September 1988, is intended to provide resolution and
rationale closing all open CIL assessment issues. In summary,
the NASA and Prime Contractor post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation
assessed is believed to be technically accurate and
complete. No assessment issues remain that have safety
implications.
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1.0-WP-VA86001-01, 14 October 1986
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2. Drapela, L. J.: Analysis of the Guidance, Navigation, and
Control Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA86001-16, 19 December 1986
3. Robb, B.J.: Analysis of the Data Processing Subsystem,
1.0-WP-VA86001-02, 24 October 1986
4. Ewell, J. J.: Analysis of the Backup Flight Subsystem,

















Hochstein, A. L. : Analysis of the Nose Wheel Steering
Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA86001-03, 1 November 1986
Addis, A. W. : Analysis of the Instrumentation Subsystem,
i. 0-WP-VA86001-17, 12 December 1986
Addis, A. W.: Analysis of the Communication and Tracking
Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA87001-09, 31 December 1987
Schmeckpeper, K. R.: Analysis of the Electrical Power
Distribution and Control Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA86001-28,
3 April 1987
Schmeckpeper, K. R.: Analysis of the Electrical Power
Distribution and Control / Electrical Power Generation
Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA86001-19, 19 December 1986
Robinson, W. W.: Analysis of the Electrical Power
Distribution and Control / Remote Manipulator Subsystem,
1.0-WP-VA86001-26, 12 February 1987
Robinson, W. W.: Analysis of the Pyrotechnics Subsystem,
I.O-WP-VA88001-01, 19 January 1988
Marino, A. J.: Analysis of the Main Propulsion Subsystem,
1.0-WP-VA86001-22, 6 January 1987
Hiott, M. R.: Analysis of the Electrical Power Generation /
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA86001-10,
5 December 1986
Hiott, M. R.: Analysis of the Electrical Power Generation /
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem,
1.0-WP-VA86001-11, 5 December 1986
Paul, D. J.: Analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem,
1.0-WP-VA86001-21, 12 January 1987
Paul, D. J.: Analysis of the Reaction Control Subsystem,
I.O-WP-VA86001-27, 19 January 1987
Barnes, J. E.: Analysis of the Auxiliary Power Unit
Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA86001-14, 12 December 1986
Davidson, W. R.: Analysis of the Hydraulics and Water Spray
Boiler Subsystems, 1.0-WP-VA86001-20, 15 December 1986
Saiidi, M. J.: Analysis of the Atmospheric Revitalization
Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA86001-13, i December 1986
Saiidi, M. J.: Analysis of the Atmospheric Revitalization


















Saiidi, M. J.: Analysis of the Life Support and Airlock
Support Subsystems, 1.0-WP-VA87001-02, 2 November 1987
Raffaelli, G. G.: Analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility
Unit, 1.0-WP-VA86001-15, 28 December 1986
Raffaelli, G. G.: Analysis of the Manned Maneuvering Unit
Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA86001-09, 21 November 1986
Weissinger, W. D.: Analysis of the Landing and Deceleration
Subsystems, 1.0-WP-VA86001-25, 19 January 1987
Riccio, J. R.: Analysis of the Ascent Thrust Vector Control
Actuator Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA86001-06, 21 November 1986
Riccio, J. R.: Analysis of the Elevon Subsystem,
I.O-WP-VA86001-07, 21 November 1986
Riccio, J. R.: Analysis of the Body Flap Subsystem,
1.0-WP-VA86001-05, 21 November 1986
Riccio, J. R.: Analysis of the Rudder/Speed Brake
Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA86001-04, 21 November 1986
Grasmeder, R. F.: Analysis of the Remote Manipulator
Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA86001-23, 12 January 1987
Drapela, L. J.: Analysis of the Displays and Control
Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA86001-16, 19 December 1986
Compton, J. M.: Analysis of the Orbiter and Experiments
Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA87005, 21 August 1987
Bynum, M. C.: Analysis of the Purge, Vent, and Drain
Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA87001-04, 18 November 1987
Lowery, H. J.: Analysis of the Mechanical Actuation
Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA87001-03, 30 November 1987
Parkman, W. E.: Analysis of the Active Thermal Control
Subsystem, 1.0-WP-VA87001-05, 1 December 1987
Sinclair, S. K.: Analysis of the Crew Equipment Subsystem,
1.0-WP-VA87001-01, 2 November 1987
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Robb, B. J.: Assessment of the Data Processing Subsystem
FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA86001-08, 28 November 1986
Ewell, J. J.: Assessment of the Backup Flight Subsystem
FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88003-022, ii March 1988
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Addis, A. W.: Assessment of the Instrumentation
Subsystem FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88003-07, 29 February 1988
Addis, A. W.: Assessment of the Communication and
Tracking Subsystem FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88005-010,
21 March 1988
Schmeckpeper, K. R.: Assessment of the Electrical Power
Distribution and Control Subsystem FMEA/CIL,
1.0-WP-VA88003-23, 26 February 1988
Schmeckpeper, K. R.: Assessment of the Electrical Power
Distribution and Control/ Electrical Power Generation
Subsystem FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88003-34, 1 March 1988
Robinson, W. W.: Assessment of the Electrical Power
Distribution and Control/ Remote Manipulator Subsystem
FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88003-35, 8 March 1988
Robinson, W. W.: Assessment of the Pyrotechnics Subsystem
FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88005-05, 5 February 1988
McNicolI, W. J.: Assessment of the Main Propulsion
Subsystem FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88003-33, 26 February 1988
Hiott, M. R.: Assessment of the Electrical Power
Generation / Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem FMEA/CIL,
1.0-WP-VA86001-24, 20 March 1987
Ames, B. E.: Assessment of the Electrical Power
Generation / Power Reactant Supply and Distribution
Subsystem FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88003-15, 12 February 1988
Prust, C. D.: Assessment of the Orbital Maneuvering
Subsystem FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88003-30, 26 February 1988
Prust, C. D.: Assessment of the Reaction Control Subsystem
FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88003-12, 26 February 1988
Barnes, J. E.: Assessment of the Auxiliary Power Unit
Subsystem FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88003-14, 19 February 1988
Davidson, W. R.: Assessment of the Hydraulics and Water
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Saiidi, M. J.: Assessment of the Manned Maneuvering Unit
Subsystem FMEA/CIL, I.O-WP-VA88003-11, 19 February 1988
Raffaelli, G. G.: Assessment of the Extravehicular
Mobility Unit Subsystem FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88003-37,
i0 March 1988
Weissinger, W. D.: Assessment of the Landing and
Deceleration Subsystem FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88003-039,
lO March 1988
Wilson, R. E.: Assessment of the Ascent Thrust Vector
Control Actuator Subsystem FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88003-03,
5 February 1988
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Subsystem FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88003-16, 26 February 1988
Compton, J. M.: Assessment of the Orbiter and Experiment
Subsystem FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88005-03, 5 February 1988
Bynum, M. C.: Assessment of the Purge, Vent, and Drain
Subsystem FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88005-02, 5 February 1988
Lowery, H. J.: Assessment of the Mechanical Actuation
Subsystem FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88003-09, 19 February 1988
Sinclair, S. K.: Assessment of the Active Thermal Control
Subsystem FMEA/CIL, 1.0-WP-VA88005-06, 12 February 1988
Sinclair, S. K.: Assessment of the Crew Equipment
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- Ammonia Boiler System
- Annunciator Control Assembly
- Aerodynamic Coefficient Instrumentation Package
- Attitude Direction Indicator
- Air Data Probe
- Audio Distribution System
- Air Data Transducer Assembly
- Aft Load Control Assembly
- Aft Motor Control Assembly
- Abort-Once-Around
- Acquisition of Signal
- Aft Power Controller
- Auxiliary Power Unit
- Aft Reaction Control System (Subsystem)
- Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control System
- Atmospheric Revitalization System
- Aerosurface Servo Amplifier
- Active Thermal Control Subsystem
- Abort-To-Orbit
- Ascent Thrust Vector Control
- Brakes and Antiskid
- Body Flap
- Backup Flight Control
- Backup Flight System
- Built-In Test Equipment
- Caution and Warning
- Change Control Board
- Contaminant Control Cartridge
- Closed-Circuit Television
- Crew Communications Umbilical
- Critical Items List
- Communications Interface Unit
- Controller
- Crew Optical Alignment Sight
- Communication
- Central Processing Unit
- Criticality
- Caution and Warning System
- Displays and Controls
- Digital Autopilot
- Display and Control Module
- Document Change Notice
- Display Driver Unit
- Display Electronic Unit
- Development Flight Instrumentation
- Data-Handling Electronics
- Deployed Mechanical Assembly
- Department of Defense
- Data Processing System (Subsystem)




















































- Environmental Control and Life Support System (Subsystem)
- Entry Interface
- Engine Interface Unit
- Extravehicular Mobility Unit
- Environmental Protection Agency
- Electrical Power, Distribution and Control
- Electrical Power Generator
- Electrical Power System
- External Tank
- Extravehicular Activity
- Extravehicular Communications System
- Fuel Cell
- Flow Control Assembly
- Freon Coolant Loop
- Flight Control Operating System
- Fuel Cell Power (Plant)
- Flight Control System
- Fault Detection and Annunciation
- Frequency Division Multiplexing
- Flash Evaporator System
- Forward Fuselage Support System for OEX
- Forward Load Control Assembly
- Failure Mode
- Forward Motor Control Assembly
- Frequency Division Multiplexer
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Forward Power Controller
- Forward Reaction Control System (Subsystem)
- Fault Summary Message
- Flight Support Structure
- Flight Systems Software Requirements
- Flight Software
- Get-Away Special
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Greenwich Mean Time
- Guidance, Navigation, and Control
- General Purpose Computer
- Ground Support Equipment
- Ground Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network
- Hybrid Driver Controller
- Heat Exchanger
- High-Resolution Accelerometer Package
- Headset Interface Unit
- High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
- High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump






















- Interface Control Module
- Intercom Master Station
- Intercommunications
- Intercom Remote Station
- In-Flight Maintenance
- Inertial Measurement Unit
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Input/Output Module
- Inertial Upper Stage
- Intravehicular Activity
- Johnson Space Center
- Ku-Band Deploy
- Load Controller Assembly
- Launch Control Center
- Liquid Cooling and Ventilation Garment
- Launch/Entry Helmet


































- Launch Processing System
- Line Replaceable Unit
- Life Support Subsystem
- Lower Torso Assembly
- Modular Auxiliary Data System
- Mechanical Actuation System
- Motor Control Assembly
- Mission Control Center (JSC)
- Multifunction CRT Display System
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Engine Controller
- Main Engine Cutoff
- Mission Elapsed Time
- Main Gear Shock Strut Assembly
- Multiplexer Interface Adapter
- Main Landing Gear
- Major Mode
- Manned Maneuvering Unit
- Mass Memory Unit
- Minimum Power Level (65%)
- Manipulator Positioning Mechanism
- Main Propulsion System (Subsystem)
- Mission Specialist
- Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System
- Manual Select Keyboard
- Master Timing Unit
- Multiplex
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Nose Landing Gear Shock Strut Assembly
- Nose Gear Touch Down
- Nose Landing Gear




















































- Network Signal Processor
- National Space Transportation System
- Nose-Wheel Steering
- Operational Bioinstrumentation System
- Orbiter Experiments
- Operational Instrumentation
- Operational Maintenance Requirements &
Specifications Document
- Orbital Maneuvering System
- Orbiter Timing Buffer
- Operational Water Dispenser Assembly
- Payload
- Primary Avionics Software System
- Push-Button Indicator
- Payload Bay Mechanical
- Power Control Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Pulse Code Modulation
- Pulse Code Modulation Master Unit
- Page Change Notice
- Pressure Control System
- Power Drive Unit
- Portable Foot Restraint
- Personal Hygiene Station
- Payload Interrogater
- Pyro Initiator Controller
- Payload Bay
- Payload Bay Door
- Primary Landing Site
- Portable Life Support Subsystem
- Propellant Management Subsystem
- Program Requirements Control Board
- Program Requirements Control Board Directive
- Primary Reaction Control System (jet)
- Payload Retention Device
- Programmable Read-Only Memory
- Power Reactant Storage and Distribution
- Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System
- Power Section Assembly
- Provision Stowage Assembly
- Payload Signal Processor
- Push-to-talk
- Purge, Vent & Drain
- Quick Disconnect
- Rudder/Pedal Brake Assembly
- Random Access Memory
- Reaction Control System
- Radiator and Flow Control Assembly
- Radio Frequency Interference





















































- Rotation Hand Controller
- Rehydration Station
- Rockwell International
- Reaction Jet Driver
- Redundancy Management
- Remote Manipulator System
- Rudder Pedal Assembly
- Remote Power Controller
- Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly
- Rudder Speed Brake
- Resistance Temperature Device
- Return-to-Launch-Site
- Remote Tracking Station
- Rotary Variable Differential Transformer
- Speed Brake Translation Controller
- Steering Control Box
- System Control Module
- Sequence Control Unit
- Service and Cooling Umbilical
- Startracker Door Mechanism
- Shuttle Entry Air Data System
- Shuttle Flight Operations Manual
- Single Failure Point
- Space Ground Link System
- Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensor
- Systems Management
- Solar Maximum Mission
- Secondary Oxygen Pack
- Space Operations Simulator
- Steering Position Amplifier
- Single Point Failure Analysis
- Surface Position Indicator
- Solid Rocket Booster
- Space Suit Assembly
- Space Shuttle Main Engine
- SSME Controller
- Space Shuttle Orbiter
- Space Shuttle Systems Handbook
- Star Tracker
- Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network
- Space Transportation System
- Tactical Air Navigation
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Thermal Control System (Subsystem)
- Touch Down
- Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
- Thruster Hand Controller
- Translation Hand Controller
- Thermal Protection System















- Urine Collection Device
- Unitized Electrode Assembly
- Ultra High Frequency
- Vent Door Mechanism
- Vernier Reaction Control System (jet)
- Wide-Band Signal Conditioner
- Window Cavity Conditioning System
- Wireless Crew Communications Umbilical
- Waste Management System
- Working Paper
- Water Removal Subsystem








Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
B-I
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 2_206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, were used with the following amplifications and
additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AO__AA- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AT__OO- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBL_ (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
M C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
M_SSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP__SS- software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/$AFING PHASE - begins at first main gear




DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for







The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware Cincluding firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error







All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to


















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:






CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





THE DOWNLOCK BUNGEE IS A MECHANICAL DEVICE THAT IF BENT OR
JAMMED IN THE EXTENDED POSITION COULD CAUSE A FORCE THAT WOULD
UNLOCK THE LOCK BRACE.
HYDRAULICS - THE EXTEND/RETRACT HYD ACTUATOR IS THE ONLY
REDUNDANT ITEM. WHEN THE VEHICLE IS SHUT DOWN POST LANDING THERE
IS NO REDUNDANCY. THE NASA FMEA/CIL DOES NOT CONSIDER APU
SHUTDOWN OCCURRING BEFORE CREW EGRESS.
NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF NLG OVERCENTER DOWNLOCK
BUNGEE STRUCTURAL FAILURE FROM 3/IR TO 2/IR. UPON FURTHER
ANALYSIS THE IOA AGREES THAT PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING (A RESULT
OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE) IS NOT A SINGLE FAILURE POINT; THEREFORE,
THE IOA CRITICALITY SHOULD BE DOWNGRADED FROM i/I TO 2/IR.





NASA FMEA #: 02-1-079-1
NASA DATA:












HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA]
[ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




SEE 10205. THERE WILL BE NO COMPLICATIONS THROUGHOUT THE
LANDING UNTIL AFTER THE VEHICLE IS SHUTDOWN. ONCE THE HYDRAULICS
SYSTEM IS DEACTIVATED THERE IS NO SYSTEM TO HOLD THE LOCK BRACE
IN POSITION, AND A GUST OF WIND, AN IMPACT FROM APPROACHING
VEHICLES OR MOVEMENT INSIDE THE VEHICLE COULD CAUSE NLG COLLAPSE.
A COLLAPSE OF THE NLG WOULD CAUSE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AND A
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE. THIS SITUATION CAN BE BYPASSED BY
INSTALLING THE LANDING GEAR SAFETY PINS IN THE LOCK BRACE PRIOR
TO HYDRAULICS SYSTEM 1 SHUTDOWN.
NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF NLG OVERCENTER DOWNLOCK
BUNGEE STRUCTURAL FAILURE FROM 3/IR TO 2/IR. UPON FURTHER
ANALYSIS THE IOA AGREES THAT STRUCTURAL FAILURE IS NOT A SINGLE
FAILURE POINT; THEREFORE, THE IOA CRITICALITY SHOULD BE
DOWNGRADED FROM i/i TO 2/IR.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
NOT CONSIDERED BY THE NASA FMEA/CIL
NASA FMEA 02-IA-076-I ADDRESSES STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE
NOSE LANDING GEAR TORQUE ARMS. THE IOA CONSIDERS THE STRUCTURAL
FAILURE OF THE STEERING DISCONNECT LOCK TO BE COVERED BY THE NASA
FMEA. THE IOA AND NASA/RI AGREE ON A i/I CRITICALITY.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]












[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
A NOSE WHEEL SLAPDOWN WHERE THE NOSE WHEEL ROTATES BEYOND A
SAFE ANGLE OF ATTACK WILL CAUSE AN IMMEDIATE COLLAPSE OF THE NLG.
NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF FMEA 02-ia-076-I FROM
2/IR TO i/I; THEREFORE, THE IOA AND NASA/RI ASSESSMENTS ARE IN
COMPLETE AGREEMENT.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]












[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [







ADDITIONAL DATA UNCOVERED AFTER STUDY COMPLETION ELIMINATES
THIS IOA EVALUATION REPORT














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]












[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NOT EVALUATED BY NASA
NASA FMEA 02-IA-075-I ADDRESSES STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE
NOSE LANDING GEAR SHOCK STRUT AND OUTER CYLINDER AND LOAD
CARRYING MEMBERS. FROM FURTHER ANALYSIS THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT
THE NOSE LANDING GEAR AXLE IS PART OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR SHOCK
STRUT ASSEMBLY AND THEREFORE CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY
THE FMEA. THERE IS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IOA AND NASA/RI THAT
THE CRITICALITY IS I/i AND THE HARDWARE FAILURE MODE IS A CIL
ITEM.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ I /1 ]












[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE WORST CASE SCENARIO FOR A BROKEN TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
WOULD BE A FAILURE THAT WOULD PREVENT THE NLG FROM LOCKING IN THE
EXTENDED POSITION. SIMILAR TO MLG TORQUE TUBE ASSY REF 02-1-010-
I.
NASA/RI CREATED A NEW FMEA (02-1A-Ill-I) FOR THE NOSE
LANDING GEAR TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY FAILURE MODE. THE IOA AND
NASA/RI ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE CRITICALITY IS 1/l.














NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]












[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ x ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALSO SEE 10202, 10203
[x]
[ ]
FMEA 02-1-077-1 COVERS THE NLG DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY BUT IT
DOES NOT COVER THE CRITICAL PARTS INDIVIDUALLY. IOA AGREES WITH
CRITICALITY.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:




NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
J. COMPTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM i. IF THE SYSTEM FAILS,
THEN THE ORBITER IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE OR
VEHICLE. THE GEAR HAS A PYRO BACKUP TO UNLOCK THE GEAR. IF IT
FAILS, THE GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY. NASA INCORPORATED THIS FMEA/CIL
INTO-AO1 WHICH IS A HIGHER CRITICALITY. AN EXTERNAL LEAK IS
STILL A LEAK REGARDLESS OF THE FAILURE MODE. ISSUE RESOLVED; IOA
ACCEPTS HIGHER CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-HOI-A04
NASA DATA:







NLG EXTEND/ RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REDUNDANCY SCREEN B BECAUSE HYD SYS 1 FLUID IS NOT
CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR ONORBIT, THUS THE FAILURE IS NOT
DETECTED. HOWEVER, FAILURE IS DETECTED WHEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED,
THUS PASSING SCREEN. NASA INCORPORATED THIS FMEA/CIL INTO-AOI,
WHICH IS A HIGHER CRITICALITY-I 1.




















CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM i. IF SYSTEM FAILS, THEN
THE ORBITER IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
PYRO BACKUP. HYDRAULIC FLUID IS NOT CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR
ONORBIT, THUS FAILURE CANNOT BE DETECTED - FAILS REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B.
WITHDRAW. THIS FAILURE IS INCORPORATED INTO-H03-1. A LEAK
IS A LEAK REGARDLESS OF THE FAILURE MODE.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




GEAR WILL NOT RELEASE HYDRAULICALLY. THE PYRO BACKUP WILL
RELEASE THE GEAR ONE SECOND AFTER THE COMMAND TO DEPLOY IF THE
LANDING GEAR HOOK IS NOT OPEN. THIS FAILURE IS THE SAME AS AN
"EXTERNAL HYDRAULIC LEAK" FOR CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, IT CAN
THIS FAILURE IS THE SAME AS AN "EXTERNAL HYDRAULIC LEAK" FOR
CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, IT CAN BE COMBINED WITH MDAC 11005.
WITHDRAW.





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-H03-I
NASA DATA:












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REDUNDANCY SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE HYD SYS. 1 FLUID IS NOT
CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR ONORBIT, THUS FAILURE NOT DETECTED.
HOWEVER, FAILURE IS DETECTED WHEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED, THUS PASSING
SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 02-1-097-1
NASA DATA:







NLG B/U PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE MECH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
SYSTEM IS NOT USED UNLESS HYDRAULIC UPLOCK RELEASE SYSTEM
FAILS. IF THIS SYSTEM FAILS WHEN CALLED ON TO FUNCTION, THERE IS
NO OTHER BACKUP.
ACCORDING TO THE REDUNDANCY RULES IN 22206, THIS SYSTEM IS A
2/IR CRITICALITY BUT, A FAILED HYDRAULICS SYSTEM ACTIVATES THIS
SYSTEM. THIS SYSTEMS FAILURE WILL NOT ACTIVATE THE HYDRAULICS.
THERE IS A LINEAR OPERATION HERE THAT WILL NOT ALLOW
REVERSAL OF THE ROLES.
THE CRITICALITY DIFFERENCE IS ATRIBUTED TO DIFFERENT
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE REDUNDANCY RULES IN NSTS 22206. FROM
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI ASSIGNMENT OF
CRITICALITY 2/IR AND THE RETENTION OF THE FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




BUNGEE COULD POSSIBLY INADVERTENTLY RELEASE CAUSING THE NLG
DOOR TO CRACK OPEN.
NASA/RI CREATED A NEW FMEA (02-IA-I02-2) WHICH ADDRESSES
PREMATURE RELEASE OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR BOOSTER BUNGEE-DOOR
EXTENSION ASSIST. THE ASSIGNED CRITICALITY IS i/i WHICH IS IN
AGREEMENT WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 02-1-001-2
NASA DATA:







SHOCK STRUT PISTON ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE NASA FMEA COVERS ONLY THE LOSS OF NITROGEN.
NASA/RI PREPARED A NEW FMEA, 02-IA-001-3, TO ADDRESS THE
LOSS OF MLG SHOCK STRUT HYDRAULIC FLUID. THE i/I CRITICALITY IS
IN AGREEMENT WITH THE IOA CRITICALITY.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:




SHOCK STRUT PISTON ASSEMBLY
W. WEISSINGER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA ASSUMES LOSS OF NITROGEN ELASTIC MEDIUM ONLY.
HYD FLUID IS CONSIDERED AS CAPABLE OF ABSORBING A LANDING
SHOCK PER MC621-0011.
IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI 3/3 CRITICAILTY FOR LOSS OF
NITROGEN PRESSURE IN THE MLG SHOCK STRUT. LOSS OF HYDRAULIC
FLUID IS A DIFFERENT FAILURE MODE AND IS COVERED BY SEPARATE
FMEA.














AXLE KIT - MLG
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA 02-1A-001-1 ADDRESSES STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE MAIN
LANDING GEAR SHOCK STRUT INNER AND OUTER CYLINDER AND LOAD
CARRING MEMBERS. FROM FURTHER ANALYSIS THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT
THE MAIN LANDING GEAR AXLE IS PART OF THE MAIN LANDING GEAR SHOCK
STRUT ASSEMBLY AND THEREFORE CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY
THE FMEA. THERE IS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IOA AND NASA/RI THAT
THE CRITICALITY IS i/i AND THE HARDWARE FAILURE MODE IS A CIL
ITEM.













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:






CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




UNTIL THE SAFETY PIN IS INSTALLED IN THE LOCK BRACE THERE IS
A MAJOR PROBLEM. FROM THE TIME THE HYD SYS 1 IS SHUTDOWN UNTIL
THE SAFETY IS INSTALLED THERE IS AN IMINENT THREAT OF COLLAPSE.
NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF MLG OVERCENTER DOWNLOCK
BUNGEE STRUCTURAL FAILURE FROM 3/IR TO 2/IR. UPON FURTHER
ANALYSIS THE IOA AGREES THAT THE DOWNLOCK BUNGEE IS NOT A SINGLE
FAILURE POINT; THEREFORE, THE IOA, CRITICALITY SHOULD BE
DOWNGRADED FROM i/I TO 2/IR.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF MLG OVERCENTER DOWNLOCK
BUNGEE STRUCTURAL FAILURE FROM 3/IR TO 2/IR. UPON FURTHER
ANALYSIS THE IOA AGREES THAT THE DOWNLOCK BUNGEE IS NOT A SINGLE
FAILURE POINT; THEREFORE, THE IOA CRITICALITY SHOULD BE
DOWNGRADED FROM I/i TO 2/IR.





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G09-A02
NASA DATA:







MLG EXTEND/ RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM I. IF SYSTEM FAILS, THEN
THE ORBITER IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
THE GEAR HAS A PYRO BACKUP TO UNLOCK THE GEAR. IF IT FAILS, THE
GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY. NASA INCORPORATED THIS FMEA/CIL
WITH-A01 WHICH IS A HIGHER CRITICALITY (I/I). AN EXTERNAL LEAK
IS A LEAK REGARDLESS OF THE FAILURE MODE. ISSUE RESOLVED; IOA
ACCEPTS HIGHER CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-GO9-A04
NASA DATA:







MLG EXTEND/ RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REDUNDANCY SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE HYD SYS 1 FLUID IS NOT
CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR ONORBIT, THUS, THE FAILURE IS NOT
DETECTED. HOWEVER, FAILURE IS DETECTED WHEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED,
THUS PASSING SCREEN. NASA INCORPORATED THIS FAILURE INTO-A01
WHICH IS A i/I.




















CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM i. IF SYSTEM FAILS, THEN
THE ORBITER IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
PYRO BACKUP. HYDRAULIC FLUID IS NOT CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR
ONORBIT, THUS FAILURE CANNOT BE DETECTED - FAILS REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B. HOWEVER, FAILURE IS DETECTED WHEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED,
THUS PASSING SCREEN.















LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




GEAR WILL NOT RELEASE HYDRAULICALLY. THE PYRO BACKUP WILL
RELEASE THE GEAR ONE SECOND AFTER THE COMMAND TO DEPLOY IF THE
LANDING GEAR HOOK IS NOT OPEN. THIS FAILURE IS THE SAME AS AN
"EXTERNAL HYDRAULIC LEAK" FOR CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, IT CAN
BE COMBINED WITH MDAC 21003. WITHDRAW.





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G08-A01
NASA DATA:












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REDUNDANCY SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE HYD. SYS. 1 FLUID IS NOT
CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR ONORBIT, THUS FAILURE NOT DETECTED.
HOWEVER, FAILURE IS DETECTED WHEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED, THUS PASSING
SCREEN.















LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CLOSED LVDT WILL RESULT IN HALF-WHEEL LOCKUP ON LANDING WITH
ANTISKID OFF, CAUSING POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE. ANTISKID WILL
PROVIDE PROTECTION IF ON.
FROM FURTHER ANALYSIS THE IOA WITHDRAWS THIS FAILURE MODE AS
A CIL ISSUE. A SHORT CIRCUIT WILL ONLY CAUSE LOSS OF BRAKING
CAPABILITY FROM ONE OF FOUR CHANNELS TO ONE WHEEL. AFTER THE
FIRST FAILURE, TWO SUCCESS PATHS REMAIN. THE ANTISKID CIRCUIT
IS A NON LIKE SYSTEM THAT OFFERS PROTECTION AGAINST BRAKE SYSTEM
CONTROL FAILURES. A FAILURE OF THE ANTISKID SYSTEM SHOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER FAILURE.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]












[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WITH BRAKE PRESSURE BEING APPLIED AT TOUCHDOWN, TIRE ON THAT
WHEEL WILL PROBABLY BLOW RIGHT AFTER TOUCHDOWN CAUSING POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE.
NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF THE BRAKE CIRCUIT
FAILURE FROM 2/IR TO i/I. THIS RESULTS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE IOA
ASSIGNED CRITICALITY.


















HYD PRESS REG (SYS 2 & 3)
J. COMPTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SEE 30129. SHOULD BE A 2 BECAUSE IF STANDBY SYSTEM HAD SOME
FAILURE VERY LITTLE BRAKING WOULD BE AVAILABLE - ONLY FROM LAST
REMAINING SYSTEM.
FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE 3/IR AND THAT THERE IS
NO METHOD TO READILY DETECT THE FAILURE (FAILS B SCREEN);
THEREFORE, THE HARDWARE FAILURE REMAINS AS A CIL ITEM. THIS IS
IN AGREEMENT WITH THE REVISED NASA/RI EVALUATION OF FMEA
02-IB-033-2.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NO CIL AVAILABLE. SHOULD BE 2/IR BECAUSE IF STANDBY FILTER
GETS CLOGGED, HALF BRAKING CAPABILITY TO BRAKES IN THAT WHEEL
WELL WILL BE LOST. SEE 30130.
ISSUE RESOLUTION:
FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE CRITICALITY
OF THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE 3/IR AND THAT THERE IS NO METHOD
TO READILY DETECT THE FAILURE (FAILS B SCREEN); THEREFORE, THE
HARDWARE FAILURE REMAINS AS A CIL ITEM. THIS IS IN AGREEMENT
WITH THE REVISED NASA/RI EVALUATION OF FMEA 02-IB-030-I.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:




BY - PASS VALVE, HYD MODULE ASSY
J. COMPTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/ FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS VALVE HAS VERY LITTLE VALUE SINCE HYD. SYS. 1 IS
SHUTDOWN AND LINE CLOSED OFF DURING FLIGHT. FLUID NOT AVAILABLE
TO VALVE UNTIL JUST PRIOR TO LANDING. IF BOTH PRIMARY AND
STANDBY SYSTEMS FAIL TO OPEN BOTH SYSTEMS MUST BE SO SLUGGISH
THAT
THE BRAKES ON THIS CONTROL MODULE WON'T FUNCTION. ALSO SEE
30131.
FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE
CRITICALITY FOR THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE 3/3 WHICH AGREES WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION. THERE ARE TWO BYPASS VALVES IN EACH MODULE
ASSEMBLY. THEY ALLOW FLUID TO CIRCULATE AND WARMUP THE RETURN
LINE. EVEN IF BOTH VALVES FAIL TO OPEN, THERE WILL STILL BE
ADEQUATE BRAKING.





NASA FMEA #: 02-1-066-2
NASA DATA:












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[P] [P] [P] [ ]*
[P] [P] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IF LOCKUP OCCURS AT HIGH SPEED, TIRE WILL BLOW CAUSING
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.
FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE DOWNGRADED FROM i/I TO
2/IR. LOSS OF BRAKING CAPABILITY ON ONE WHEEL (25% OF TOTAL) IS
PROBABLE EFFECT RATHER THAN A BLOWN TIRE WHICH COULD CAUSE
DIRECTIONAL CONTROL PROBLEMS. THIS IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE
REVISED NASA/RI EVALUATION OF FMEA 02-IE-066-2.





NASA FMEA #: 02-1-033-2
NASA DATA:







HYD PRESS REG (SYS I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
SEE 30111 - DIFFERENT BECAUSE THIS DOESN'T PASS REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B.
FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE 3/IR AND THAT THERE IS
NO METHOD TO READILY DETECT THE FAILURE (FAILS B SCREEN);
THEREFORE, THE HARDWARE FAILURE REMAINS AS A CIL ITEM. THIS IS
IN AGREEMENT WITH THE REVISED NASA/RI EVALUATION OF FMEA 02-IB-
033-2.





NASA FMEA #: 02-1-030-1
NASA DATA:







INLET FILTER, HYD MODULEASSY (SYS i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




SEE 30112 - SYS 1 DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE CRITICALITY
OF THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE 3/IR AND THAT THERE IS NO METHOD
TO READILY DETECT THE FAILURE (FAILS B SCREEN); THEREFORE, THE
HARDWARE FAILURE REMAINS AS A CIL ITEM. THIS IS IN AGREEMENT
WITH THE REVISED NASA/RI EVALUATION OF FMEA 02-IB-030-2.





NASA FMEA #: 02-1-029-2
NASA DATA:







BY - PASS VALVE, HYD MODULEASSY (SYS 2&3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[P] [ P] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SEE 30116. SINCE CIRC PUMPS ARE ON FOR THESE SYSTEMS
ONORBIT, THIS FAILURE COULD BE DETECTED INFLIGHT.
FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE
CRITICALITY FOR THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE 3/3 WHICH AGREES WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION. THERE ARE TWO BYPASS VALVES IN EACH MODULE
ASSEMBLY. THEY ALLOW FLUID TO CIRCULATE AND WARMUP THE RETURN
LINE. EVEN IF BOTH VALVES FAIL TO OPEN, THERE WILL STILL BE
ADEQUATE BRAKING.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2205-2
NASA DATA:







TRANSIENT SUPPRESSORDIODE (4), 3 AMPS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND IOA RECOMMENDS
DOWNGRADING THE CRITICALITY AND REMOVING THIS ITEM FROM CIL.
LOSS OF TWO DIODES IS LOSS OF A HYDRAULIC SYSTEM WHICH THEN
RESULTS IN 3/IR CRITICALITY.
IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A
MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2115-3
NASA DATA:







PUSHBUTTON SWITCH (2), LANDING GEAR DOWN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PROVIDES REDUNDANT MANUAL "ON" CONTROL FROM CONTROL BUS TO
LATCHING RELAYS FOR LANDING GEAR DOWN CIRCUIT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A
MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2116-3
NASA DATA:







LANDING GEAR TOGGLE SWITCH, S13
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION, FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT
ON SUBSYSTEM. CB60 REMAINS "OFF" UNTIL NEEDED. HOWEVER, IOA
ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2117-I
NASA DATA:







PUSHBUTTON SWITCH, LDG GR ARM, 4PDT, ILLUMINATED




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




PROVIDES REDUNDANT MANUAL "ON" CONTROL FROM CONTROL BUS TO
LATCHING RELAYS FOR LANDING GEAR ARM CIRCUIT. IOA DOES NOT
CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND IOA RECOMMENDS: (i)
CHANGING THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS, IT FAILS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B,
AND LOWERING THE CRITICALITY TO 3/IR. HOWEVER, IOA ACCEPTS THE
MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A MORE CONSERVATIVE
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND IOA
RECOMMENDS: CHANGING THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS SINCE IT FAILS
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B, AND DOWNGRADING THE CRITICALITY TO 3/IR.
TRANSFERRED OUT OF LANDING/DECEL. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE
NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A MORE CONSERVATIVE
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2303-I
NASA DATA:







GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (2), 5 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA 2303-1
AND IOA RECOMMENDS CHANGING THE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO CONFORM TO
NSTS 22206.
FURTHER ANALYSIS INDICATES DOWNLIST PARAMETERS ARE AVAILABLE TO
DETERMINE STATUS OF THIS STRING, THUS INDICATING FUSE IS
FUNCTIONING





NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2406-I
NASA DATA:







HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1
HDC, IOA RECOMMENDS: DOWNGRADING CRITICALITY TO 3/3 AND COMBINING
FMEA'S 2406-1 AN 2406-2 TOGETHER TO CONFORM TO NSTS 22206.
IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A
MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2409-I
NASA DATA:







HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER _TYPE 3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 3 HDC'S.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE FMEA TO THE CIL BECAUSE IT FAILS
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
FURTHER ANALYSIS INDICATES DOWNLIST PARAMETERS ARE AVAILABLE TO
DETERMINE STATUS OF THIS FUNCTION.














HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER(TYPE I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE UNCOVERED TYPE 1 HDC TO NASA'S
FMEA/CIL. THE HDC CONNECTS MAIN BUS DC POWER TO THE "WOW2"
CIRCUITS WITHIN BRAKE/SKID CONTROL BOX A.
MOVED TO NOSE WHEEL STEERING EPD&C.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-200200-I
NASA DATA:







HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE III)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA INCORPORATED FMEA INTO OTHER FMEAS. SEE ASSESSMENT LDGDEC-
31164.
NASA HAS NOW GENERATED SEPARATE FMEAS AND THIS IS NOW COVERED BY
05-6BA-2410-2. NASA CONCURS WITH SCREEN B FAILING.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2501-2
NASA DATA:








LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR 'ARM' CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
FMEA 2501-2 HAS A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE (SHORTS TO GROUND) AND
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FMEA AND ITS CIL BE DELETED. NASA
INCORPORATED 2501-2 INTO 2501-1.
NASA HAS DELETED FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2502-2
NASA DATA:








LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR 'DOWN' CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT FMEA 2502-2 AND ITS CIL BE DELETED, BECAUSE
IT HAS A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE: SHORTS TO GROUND. NASA
INCORPORATED 2502-2 INTO 2502-1.
NASA HAS DELETED FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2578-I
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31183
ITEM: DIODE, 12 AMP











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE ISOLATION DIODE TO NASA'S CIL. THE
DIODE ISOLATES THE K6 & K7 ARM RELAYS FROM THE K8 DOWN RELAYS;
DIODE IS ALSO IN THE CIRCUIT SUPPLYING POWER TO THE LDG GEAR
CONTROL VALVE AND THE LDG GEAR DUMP CONTROL VALVE. POSSIBLE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF POWER TO OPERATE THESE VALVES
IF THE DIODE FAILS OPEN.
FURTHER ANALYSIS INDICATES DOWNLINK PARAMETERS ARE AVAILABLE TO
DETERMINE STATUS OF THIS STRING, THUS INDICATING IF DIODE FAILS
OPEN, PASSING THE SCREEN. NASA UPGRADED THIS FAILURE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2241-I
NASA DATA:







GENERALPURPOSEFUSE (8), 2 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE GENERAL
PURPOSE FUSES. IOA RECOMMENDS: CHANGING THE REDUNANCY SCREENS
SINCE IT FAILS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B, AND DOWNGRADING FMEA TO A
3/IR. HOWEVER, IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY
WHICH IS DUE TO A MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY
GROUNRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2249-I
NASA DATA:







CURRENTLIMITING RESISTOR (4), 1.21K, 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE RPC
CONTROL CIRCUIT CURRENT LIMITING RESISTORS. IOA RECOMMENDS (I)
CHANGING THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS (2) ADDING FMEA 2249-1 TO THE CIL
SINCE IT FAILS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
FURTHER ANALYSIS INDICATES DOWNLIST PARAMETERS ARE AVAILABLE TO
DETERMINE STATUS OF STRING, THUS INDICATING THAT RESISTOR MUST BE
FUNCTIONING.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2096-2
NASA DATA:












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P 3 [ F 3 [ P ] [ X 3
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT FMEA 2096-2 BE DELETED, BECAUSE IT IS A NON-
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE (SHORTS TO GROUND) FOR THE NONLATCHING
RELAYS. NASA INCORPORATED FMEA 2096-2 INTO 2096-3.
THIS FMEA DELETED.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2107-3
NASA DATA:












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P] [ P] [ P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDS DOWN-
GRADING FMEA 2107-3 TO CRITICALITY 3/3.












LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE "MAIN C" TOGGLE
SWITCH AND IOA RECOMMENDS CHANGING THE CRITICALITY TO 3/3.
NASA CRITICALITY IS NOW 3/3.
REPORT DATE 19 JUNE 1988 C. 1-53

SECTION C. 2






NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332404-6
NASA DATA:












HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY, BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (J. JANNEY/ES3) ON 3/31/88. FORWARD/MID
WINDOWS DO NOT EXCEED DESIGN MARGINS FOR THIS FAILURE MODE,
ACCORDING TO ROCKWELL INT. ANALYSIS.









LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A PV&D FMEA/CIL WAS NOT FOUND FOR THE FAILURE MODE, WCCS OUTER
TUBING CLOGS. TUBING CLOGS WOULD DEGRADE WCCS DEPRESSURIZATION
AND REPRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY WITH POSSIBLE THERMAL PANE
RUPTURE.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA THAT THIS FAILURE MODE IS NOT CREDIBLE,
EXCLUDING HUMAN ERRORS DURING REFURBISHMENT, AS DISCUSSED WITH
NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (J. JANNEY/ES3) ON 3/31/88 AND 4/4/88.
PORTS ARE PROTECTED BY DEBRIS SCREENS. LINE IS CHECKED FOR FREE
FLOW DURING VEHICLE TURNAROUND.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332406-5
NASA DATA:









HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY, BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (J. JANNEY/ES3) ON 3/31/88. FORWARD/MID
WINDOWS DO NOT EXCEED DESIGN MARGINS FOR THIS FAILURE MODE,
ACCORDING TO ROCKWELL INT. ANALYSIS.








NASA FMEA #: 02-4-RI03-2
NASA DATA:












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
























NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NEW NASA FMEA # P2-4H-RI05-1 HAS BEEN GENERATED FOR THIS
ASSESSMENT, CRITICALITY 2/IR NNP. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS
CRITICALITY.

















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RECOMMEND THAT CRITICALITY BE UPGRADED.
NEW NASA FMEA # P2-4H-RI06-1 HAS BEEN GENERATED FOR THIS
ASSESSMENT, CRITICALITY 3/IR NNP. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS
CRITICALITY.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FMEA/CIL HAS BEEN DELETED BY NASA. IOA CONCURS WITH
DELETION.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NEW NASA FMEA # P2-4H-RI05-1 HAS BEEN GENERATED FOR THIS
ASSESSMENT, CRITICALITY 2/IR NNP. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS
CRITICALITY.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NEW NASA FMEA # P2-4H-RI07-1 HAS BEEN GENERATED FOR THIS
ASSESSMENT, CRITICALITY i/I NNN. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 19 JULY 1988 C.3-7

SECTION C.4
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE CAPABILITY TO REMOVE H2 FROM THE WATER IS LOST, AND THERE IS
NO OTHER WAY TO PROVIDE FOR THIS LOSS. THE PRESENCE OF H2 IN THE
WATER MAY CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH FES AND DUMP OPERATIONS, AND CREATE
CREW ILLNESS. THIS MAY HAVE POTENTIAL MISSION IMPACT
SPECIALLY FOR THE EMU/EVA MISSION - RECHARGING THE EMU WATER
TANKS WITH THE H2/H20 MIXTURE IS HAZARDOUS AND SHOULD NOT BE
DONE. ALTERNATE WATER LINE PLUS FCP RELIEF LINE ARE AVAILABLE TO
EXPEL WATER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCIES WITH THIS FAILURE WILL
DEAD-HEAD FUEL CELLS, THUS POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
WITHDREW ISSUE.
H2 SEPARATOR PROBLEMS ON PREVIOUS MISSIONS (H2 IN SUPPLY H20)
WERE CONCERNS BUT BY PROCEDURAL MANAGEMENT THE MISSIONS WERE NOT
TERMINATED. MAJOR PROBLEM (WORST CASE) H20 FLOODING THE FUEL
CELL LIST CRIT REFLECTING HARDWARE CRITICALITY OF 3.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE CAPABILITY TO REMOVE H2 FROM THE WATER IS LOST, AND THERE IS
NO OTHER WAY TO PROVIDE FOR THIS LOSS. THE PRESENCE OF H2 IN THE
WATER MAY CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH FES AND DUMP OPERATIONS, AND CREATE
CREW ILLNESS. THIS MAY HAVE POTENTIAL MISSION IMPACT
SPECIALLY FOR THE EMU/EVA MISSION - RECHARGING THE EMU WATER
TANKS WITH THE H2/H20 MIXTURE IS HAZARDOUS AND SHOULD NOT BE
DONE. ALTERNATE WATER LINE PLUS FCP RELIEF LINE ARE AVAILABLE TO
EXPEL WATER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCIES WITH THIS FAILURE WILL
DEAD-HEAD FUEL CELLS, THUS POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
THIS FMEA WAS CONSIDERED SAME AS 06-2-1101-1 FOR THE FAILURE MODE
STUDIED, AND MAY THEREFOR BE COMBINED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. H2 SEPARATOR PROBLEMS ON PREVIOUS MISSIONS (H2
IN SUPPLY H20) WERE CONCERNS BUT BY PROCEDURAL MANAGEMENT THE
MISSIONS WERE NOT TERMINATED. MAJOR PROBLEM (WORST CASE) IS H20
FLOODING CELL LIST CRIT REFLECTING HARDWARE CRITICALITY OF 3.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/ FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT SEE HOW THE FAILURE OF THIS ITEM WILL HAVE ANY
EFFECT ON THE OPERATION OF THE RADIATORS OR AMMONIA BOILER IN
ORDER TO LOOSE TOTAL COOLING CAPABILITY. LOSS OF WATER TO
REPLENISH THE TANKS, WILL FORCE MISSION TO BE SHORTED
(FLIGHT RULE 9-24). SINCE ADDITIONAL WATER WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE
FOR ON-ORBIT FES USE AND CREW REQUIREMENT. FUEL CELLS WILL NOT
BE DEAD-HEADED SINCE THIS FAILURE WILL ALWAYS RELIEVE THE WATER
OUT.
UPDATE TO NEW CRITICALITY.
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER A NEW CRITICALITY WAS AGREED UPON. THE
CRITICALITY IS DERIVED UPON A SCENERIO WHERE H20 LEAKAGE TO THE
VACUUM VENT DUCT CAN CAUSE UNCONTROLABLE BUILDUP OF ICE AT THE
OUTLET PORT WHICH CAN SEVERLY DAMAGE VEHICLE STRUCTURE DURING
ENTRY. EVEN IF THE FORMATION WERE FREED FROM THE VEHICLE VIA RMS
OR EVA THE BUILDUP COULD NOT BE CONTROLLED WHILE PREPARING FOR
ENTRY SINCE THE FUEL CELLS MUST CONTINUE TO OPERATE.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ASSESSMENT IS BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT: - WATER WILL FLOW
THROUGH TO THE TANKS; - LOSS OF ONE SEPARATOR IS SIGNIFICANT.
THE BACKUP SEPARATOR IS NOT ADEQUATE TO REMOVE ALL OF THE
HYDROGEN (WORST CASE). THE INABILITY TO REMOVE H2 (WITH WATER
FLOWING) WILL HAVE POTENTIAL MISSION IMPACT AS EXPLAINED IN MDAC-
Ii00.
WITHDRAW ISSUES. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
THE GREATEST CONCERN IS H2 IN EMU H20. FIRST FAILURE MEANS THE
H2 CONCENTRATION WILL INCREASE. SECOND FAILURE (2ND SEPARATOR)
MEANS FURTHER PROBLEMS. IF WATER MANAGEMENT PROCEDURALLY ALLOWS
H2 INTO THE EMU SOURCE TANK C, PROBLEMS CAN BE EXPECTED AND
LOSS OF CREWMAN IS POSSIBLE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1233. THIS FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS LINES AND
FITTINGS.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H20 IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MICROBIAL FILTER QUICK DISCONNECT (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1233. THIS FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS LINES AND
FITTINGS.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H20 IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TANKS INLET ISOLATION VALVE (4)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1233. THIS FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS LINES AND
FITTINGS.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H20 IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1165-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TANKS OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE (4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







THIS FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS LINES AND
IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOOSE THE FES.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1123-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES (FCP WATER LINES) WITH THIS
FAILURE WILL STILL PROVIDE TANK A ULLAGE TO MANAGE THE WATER.
MISSION TERMINATION IS EMMINENT, RETURN ON TANKS C AND D, OR JUST
TANK A. ALTERNATE FCP LINE WILL NOT PROVIDE HYDROGEN
REMOVAL. IOA CONSIDERED BOTH RELIEF VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS-SEE
FMEA 06-2-1141 (LS-II35A).
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING DANGER TO
CREW/VEHCILE.
THE NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERS THE FAILURE OF THE CAPABILITY TO
REMOVE H20 FROM THE FUEL CELLS WHICH REQUIRES FOUR FAILURES
BEFORE THE FUEL CELLS FLOOD. THIS FAILURE SHOULD HAVE MISSION
EFFECTS BEFORE THE CREW/VEHICLE LOSS EFFECTS CAN OCCUR. IN THE
STRICTEST SENSE, THE FAILURE SHOULD BE A 2R, BUT THE NASA
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH IS UNDERSTOOD.











RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES (FCP WATER LINES) WITH THIS
FAILURE WILL STILL PROVIDE TANK A ULLAGE TO MANAGE THE WATER.
MISSION TERMINATION IS EMMINENT, RETURN ON TANKS C AND D, OR JUST
TANK A. ALTERNATE FCP LINE WILL NOT PROVIDE HYDROGEN
REMOVAL. IOA CONSIDERED BOTH RELIEF VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS-SEE
FMEA 06-2-1123-1 (LS-I135).
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING DANGER TO
CREW/VEHCILE.
THE NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERS THE FAILURE OF THE CAPABILITY TO
REMOVE H20 FROM THE FUEL CELLS WHICH REQUIRES FOUR FAILURES
BEFORE THE FUEL CELLS FLOOD. THIS FAILURE SHOULD HAVE MISSION
EFFECTS BEFORE THE CREW/VEHICLE LOSS EFFECTS CAN OCCUR. IN THE
STRICTEST SENSE, THE FAILURE SHOULD BE A 2R, BUT THE NASA
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH IS UNDERSTOOD.











RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES (FCP WATER LINES) WITH THIS
FAILURE WILL STILL PROVIDE TANK A ULLAGE TO MANAGE THE WATER.
MISSION TERMINATION IS EMMINENT, RETURN ON TANKS C AND D, OR JUST
TANK A. ALTERNATE FCP LINE WILL NOT PROVIDE HYDROGEN
REMOVAL. THE FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS ONE LINES & FITTINGS
ANALYSIS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING DANGER TO
CREW/VEHCILE.
THE NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERS THE FAILURE OF THE CAPABILITY TO
REMOVE H20 FROM THE FUEL CELLS WHICH REQUIRES FOUR FAILURES
BEFORE THE FUEL CELLS FLOOD. THIS FAILURE SHOULD HAVE MISSION
EFFECTS BEFORE THE CREW/VEHICLE LOSS EFFECTS CAN OCCUR. IN THE
STRICTEST SENSE, THE FAILURE SHOULD BE A 2R, BUT THE NASA
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH IS UNDERSTOOD.











RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT THAT THE FUEL CELLS WILL BE
DEAD HEADED AFTER R. VALVE FAILURE. CHECK VALVES IN THE FCP
WATER LINE WILL PREVENT BACK FLOW TO THE CELLS. FES OPERATION
WILL BE MAINTAINED BY COMBINED WATER IN TANKS A AND B DRAWING
APPROXIMATELY 80 LB/HR OF WATER. FAILURE OF THE RELIEF VALVES IN
THE FCP LINE ARE CONSIDERED UNASSOCIATED WITH THE FAILURE OF 1.5
PSID VALVE. NO PROBLEM IS ANTICIPATED POST MECO. FUNCTIONAL
LOSS (NO C.V.) WILL RESULT IN FLOW OF WATER THRU THE FCP VENT
LINE FOR 8-10 MINUTES DURING PRE-MECO. IOA CONSIDERED BOTH
VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS-SEE FMEA 06-2-1141-2 (LS-II36A).
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING HARDWARE CRITICALITY
OF 2. EVEN THOUGH THE CHECK VALVES WILL KEEP BACKFLOW FROM
ENTERING THE FUEL CELLS THE HEAD PRESSURE CREATED FROM THE ASCENT
ACCELERATIONS CAN KEEP H20 FROM EXITING THE FUEL CELL BY
THE NORMAL H20 LINES. IF THIS OCCURS AND THE FUEL CELL RELIEF IS
PLUGGED THE 2/IR SITUATION EXISTS.











RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1233. THE FMEA CONSIDERED SEVERAL ITEMS IN ONE LINES
AND FITTINGS ANALYSIS.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H20 IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.











QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1131-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.











QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.











QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS ; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.











CAP, GSE QD (2)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.











CAP, GSE QD (2)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SEE MDAC-1235 FOR REMARKS. THE FMEA CONSIDERED SEVERAL ITEMS IN
ONE LINES AND FITTINGS ANALYSIS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOOSE THE FES.
THE VALVE CONSTRUCTION IS SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES WOULD HAVE TO
TAKE PLACE TO GIVE A LEAK THAT AFFECTS BOTH SIDES OF OUTLET
SYSTEM AND THUS CAUSE A FES LOSS.











ISOL VALVE, FES B LINE (I)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE)




SEE MDAC-1235 FOR REMARKS. THE FMEA COVERED SEVERAL ITEMS INTO
ONE ANALYSIS FOR LINES AND FITTINGS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOOSE THE FES.











SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (i)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
ZOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ J [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS WAS ATTEMPTED.
UPDATE TO NEW CRITICALITY.
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER A NEW CRITICALITY WAS AGREED UPON. THE CRITICALITY IS
DERIVED FROM THE INLET SIDE H20 SYSTEMS LEAKS RESULTING IN FREE
H20 IN THE CABIN WHICH IS A 2/2 CRITICALITY. IN THE CASE OF THE
GALLY THE LINE IF LEAKING CAN BE ISOLATED VIA A QUICK DISCONNECT
WHICH IS CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN ISOLATING THE LEAK.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2033-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPED.
UPDATE TO NEW CRITICALITY.
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER A NEW CRITICALITY WAS AGREED UPON. THE CRITICALITY IS
DERIVED FROM THE INLET SIDE H20 SYSTEMS LEAKS RESULTING IN FREE
H20 IN THE CABIN WHICH IS A 2/2 CRITICALITY. IN THE CASE OF THE
GALLY THE LINE IF LEAKING CAN BE ISOLATED VIA A QUICK DISCONNECT
WHICH IS CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN ISOLATING THE LEAK.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2005-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, GALLEY VALVE (I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
UPDATE TO NEW CRITICALITY.
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER A NEW CRITICALITY WAS AGREED UPON. THE CRITICALITY IS
DERIVED FROM THE INLET SIDE H20 SYSTEMS LEAKS RESULTING IN FREE
H20 IN THE CABIN WHICH IS A 2/2 CRITICALITY. IN THE CASE OF THE
GALLY THE LINE IF LEAKING CAN BE ISOLATED VIA A QUICK DISCONNECT
WHICH IS CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN ISOLATING THE LEAK.











DUMP ISOL VALVE (i)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO THE CREW MODULE OR OUTSIDE TO THE
MIDBODY UNLESS THE LEAK IS STOPPED BY SHUTTING OFF THE TANKS A
AND B OUTLET VALVES AND X-OVER VALVE. IN THIS CASE, THE USE OF
A/L SUPPORT (EVA MISSION) AND TWO TANKS ARE LOST FROM THE
WATER MANAGEMENT - MISSION IMPACT. NO REDUNDANCY EXISTS TO
COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS. ALSO, LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE
REDUNDANCIES (FESB, FCP RELIEF) WITH THIS FAILURE RESULTS IN
CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO CABIN - FCP OPERATING. THIS FMEA
INCLUDES SEVERAL ITEMS INTO ONE ANALYSIS FOR LINES AND FITTINGS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE. LEAKS IN THE
OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM (i.e. FES INLET) CAN WITH A
SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY
FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND RADIATORS ARE THEN
AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO
FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOOSE THE FES.











SWITCH, DUMP VALVE (I)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE.
DUMP MAY BE CONTROLLED VIA DUMP ISOLATION VALVE AND THE
CONTINGENCY COLLECTION DEVICE IS AVAILABLE FOR SUBSEQUENT WASTE
WATER MANAGEMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1135-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






QD, CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE (I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT KNOW OF THE CAP. BASED ON THE SAME RATIONING AS 06-
2-1124-2, HYDROPHOBIC FILTER, FOR WHICH THE WATER WILL LEAK INTO
THE CABIN, THIS SHOULD BE 3/2R. LOSS OF FUNCTION WITH NO CREW
INTERVENTION WILL RESULT IN CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER
(TANK B ONLY) INTO THE CABIN. ALSO, THE DUMP WITH X-TIE CAN
STILL BE ACHIEVED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOOSE THE FES.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1162-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






QD, CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE (i)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT KNOW OF THE CAP. BASED ON THE SAME RATIONING AS 06-
2-1124-2, HYDROPHOBIC FILTER, FOR WHICH THE WATER WILL LEAK INTO
THE CABIN, THIS SHOULD BE 3/2R. LOSS OF FUNCTION WITH NO CREW
INTERVENTION WILL RESULT IN CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER
(TANK B ONLY) INTO THE CABIN. ALSO, THE DUMP WITH X-TIE CAN
STILL BE ACHIEVED. THIS FMEA INCLUDES SEVERAL ITEMS INTO LINES
AND FITTINGS ANALYSIS-SEE FMEA 06-2-1135-2 (LS-1228).
WITHDRAW ISSUE.
THIS ASSESSMENT WAS MISTAKENLY MADE BETWEEN THE CONTINGENCY
CROSSTIE BETWEEN THE SUPPLY & WASTE H20 SYSTEMS AND THE FOUR-WAY
CROSS-FITTING ON THE SUPPLY WATER INLET LINES.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE FMEA ABOUT THE FAILURES OF THE
RADIATOR AND ABS. THESE ITEMS ARE NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE ITEM
BEING STUDIED. CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO THE MID-BODY OR
CREW MODULE - LEAK CANNOT BE ISOLATED WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN THE
FCP.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE IF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H20 IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE FMEA, ABOUT THE FAILURES OF THE
RADIATOR AND ABS. THESE ITEMS ARE NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE ITEM
BEING STUDIED. CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO THE MID-BODY OR
CREW MODULE - LEAK CANNOT BE ISOLATED WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN THE
FCP.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE IF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H20 IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1156-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FOR LEAKAGE BETWEEN THE A/B AND B/C RELIEF VALVES: I) CONTINUOUS
FLOW OF FCP (PRIME/ALTER) TO CREW CABIN - NO WAY TO ISOLATE LEAK
WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN THE FUEL CELLS, 2) TANKS C/D AVAILABLE FOR
RETURN WITH EXISTING LEAK.
FOR LEAKAGE DOWNSTREAM OF THE B/C RELIEF VALVE: - TANKS C AND D
COULD BE ISOLATED, AND TANK B KEPT LOW IN ORDER TO ISOLATE THE
LEAKAGE - LESS SEVERE THAN PREVIOUS CASE.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOSE THE FES.























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




LEAKAGE UPSTREAM OF THE X-OVER VALVE: - TANKS C/D TO BE SHUT
DOWN IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK; - LOSS OF FES FEEDLINE B, AND TWO
TANKS RESERVE; - TANKS A AND B AND FES FEEDLINE A AVAILABLE.
LEAKAGE DOWNSTREAM OF THE X-OVER VALVE: - TANKS A AND B TO BE
SHUTDOWN IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK; - LOSS OF FES FEEDLINE A,
PRIMARY DUMP, X-TIE FUNCTION, AND A/L SUPPORT; - ONLY TWO TANKS
AVAILABLE PLUS FES FEEDLINE B.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOSE THE FES.













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




LEAKAGE UPSTREAM OF THE X-OVER VALVE: - TANKS C/D TO BE SHUT
DOWN IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK; - LOSS OF FES FEEDLINE B, AND TWO
TANKS RESERVE; - TANKS A AND B AND FES FEEDLINE A AVAILABLE.
LEAKAGE DOWNSTREAM OF THE X-OVER VALVE: - TANKS A AND B TO BE
SHUTDOWN IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK; - LOSS OF FES FEEDLINE A,
PRIMARY DUMP, X-TIE FUNCTION, AND A/L SUPPORT; - ONLY TWO TANKS
AVAILABLE PLUS FES FEEDLINE B.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOSE THE FES.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1103-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LINES AND FITTINGS, H2 VENT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE LOSS OF FUNCTION PLUS THIS FAILURE WILL ONLY RESULT IN
INABILITY TO REMOVE H2 FROM WATER - WATER FROM FCP STILL FLOWS TO
THE TANKS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
THE GREATEST CONCERN IS H2 IN EMU H20. FIRST FAILURE MEANS THE
H2 CONCENTRATION WILL INCREASE. SECOND FAILURE (2ND SEPARATOR)
MEANS FURTHER PROBLEMS. IF WATER MANAGEMENT PROCEDURALLY ALLOWS
H2 INTO THE EMU SOURCE TANK C, PROBLEMS CAN BE EXPECTED AND
LOSS OF CREWMAN IS POSSIBLE.











WCS TO WWS QD (i)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ S ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW BUT ALSO INCLUDES ARS LINES.
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE QD BY RESTRICTED FLOW ONLY
RESTRICTS THE USE OF THE WCS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY BE
INSUFFICIENT FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS CREATING A MISSION LOSS
CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION
OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA
ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT.
THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA
ANALYSIS. WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB
AND UCD ARE ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS
REDUNDANCY IN THE STRICKEST SENSE.











WCS TO WWS QD (I)







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE QD BY RESTRICTED FLOW ONLY
RESTRICTS THE USE OF THE WCS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY BE
INSUFFICIENT FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS CREATING A MISSION LOSS
CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION
OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA
ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT.
THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA
ANALYSIS. WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB
AND UCD ARE ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS
REDUNDANCY IN THE STRICKEST SENSE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0435-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE DYNATUBE BY RESTRICTED FLOW ONLY
RESTRICTS THE USE OF THE WCS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY BE
INSUFFICIENT FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS CREATING A MISSION LOSS
CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION
OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA
ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT.
THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA
ANALYSIS. WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB
AND UCD ARE ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS
REDUNDANCY IN THE STRICKEST SENSE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0443-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE DYNATUBE BY RESTRICTED FLOW ONLY
RESTRICTS THE USE OF THE WCS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY BE
INSUFFICIENT FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS CREATING A MISSION LOSS
CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION
OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA
ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT.
THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA
ANALYSIS. WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB
AND UCD ARE ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS
REDUNDANCY IN THE STRICKEST SENSE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0401-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANUAL VENT VALVE (I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
IOA COMMENT: IF THE VALVE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE DEVELOPS SUCH THAT
THE AIR FLOW IS DOWNSTREAM OF THE VALVE CONTROLLER (PAST 2 SEALS)
THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE WOULD BE POSSIBLE DUE TO
UNCONTROLLED CABIN PRESSURE LOSS IF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION
VALVE DID NOT FUNCTION TO RESTRICT THE AIR FLOW. THE RECOMMENDED
CRITICALITY WOULD BE 3/IR PNP.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED THE FIRST
FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE THREATENING
CONDITION. WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. IF THE
VALVE LEAKS THE ONLY REDUNDANCY LEFT IS THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION
VALVE. THUS CRITICALITY IS 2/IR.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0314-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WASTETANK N2 HYDROPHOBICFILTER (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: INTERNAL LEAKAGE
IOA COMMENT: THE FAILURE OF THE FILTER IS NO CRITICALITY CHANGE,
HOWEVER IF THE LOSS OF THE BELLOWS OCCURS THEN THE FCB AND UCD
MUST BE USED AS REDUNDANT SUPPLIES WHICH MAY REQUIRE TERMINATION
OF THE MISSION BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT UCD SUPPLIES PAST
3-DAYS USAGE. THE NEW CRITICALITY SHOULD BE 3/2R FNP.
THE DISAGREEMENT IN THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS WAS DUE TO NO DETAILED
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGERS REGARDING THE
REDUNDANT PATHS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT, AS STATED IN
PREVIOUS IOA REMARKS.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0420-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GSE FILL AND PLUG (i)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARI CKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE
IOA COMMENT: IF THE LEAKAGE DEVELOPS AFTER GROUND SERVICING AND
THE CAP, AS SECONDARY SEAL, ALSO FAILS, THEN A POTENTIAL FOR LOSS
OF LIFE OCCURS DUE TO CABIN PRESSURE LOSS FOR A CRITICALITY OF
3/IR FFP.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE CONDITION OF A POTENTIAL CABIN
ATMOSPHERE LEAK, IF A SECOND FAILURE OCCURED IN THE REDUNDANCY
STREAM, TO BE A LIFE CRITICAL CONDITION.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY CORRECT. IF THE IOA FAILURE
OCCURS THE LEAK RATE WOULD BE SUCH THAT THE CABIN PRESSURE COULD
BE MAINTAINED EASILY, BASED UPON LINE SIZE AND CONSTRUCTION OF
THE QD AND CAP SEALING CAPABILITIES. THUS MISSION LOSS SHOULD
BE WORST CASE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0438-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DUMPLINES, FITTINGS, JOINTS AND UNIONS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
IOA COMMENT: THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE DUMP LINE PRODUCES A
LOSS OF MISSION WITH NO CHANGE IN CRITICAL EVENTS.
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY FOR THE WASTE WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS AND ADD 3/IR PPP CRTICALITY FOR SUPPLY WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL OTHER WASTE WATER
DUMP COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0438-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DUMP LINES, FITTINGS AND CONNECTIONS
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW.
IOA COMMENT: THE RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE DUMP LINE PRODUCES A LOSS
OF MISSION WITH NO CHANGE IN CRITICAL EVENTS.
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY FOR THE WASTE WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS AND ADD 3/IR PPP CRTICALITY FOR SUPPLY WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL OTHER WASTE WATER
DUMP COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0438-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






QD AND TP @ HIGH CAP. FILTER (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF DUMP LINE AND WCS FUNCTION REQUIRES USE OF
CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS AND A LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
LOSS OF ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE CAPABILITY.
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY FOR THE WASTE WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS AND ADD 3/IR PPP CRTICALITY FOR SUPPLY WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL OTHER WASTE WATER
DUMP COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]









[ P ] [ NA]











[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED BLOCKED FLOW
NOTE TO NASA: WHY ARE 06-2-0423-1 AND 06-2-0438-1 NOT CONSISTENT
FOR CRITICALITY?
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY FOR THE WASTE WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS AND ADD 3/IR PPP CRTICALITY FOR SUPPLY WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL OTHER WASTE WATER
DUMP COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0431-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CONTINGENCY H20 CROSS-TIE QD AND PLUG (I)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








INABILITY TO MATE/DE-MATE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED
FAILS CLOSED, RESTRICTED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF DUMP LINE AND WCS FUNCTION REQUIRES USE OF
CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS AND A LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
LOSS OF ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE CAPABILITY.
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IN THE STRICTEST SENSE THIS SHOULD HAVE A DUAL
CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR WASTE H20 AND 3/IR FOR SUPPLY H20. THE
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER HAS FOREGONE WASTE CRITICALITY SAYING ONLY
SUPPLY TO WASTE FLOW WILL BE ALLOWED.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VF-2001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DUMP VALVE/NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
THE LOSS OF THE WASTE WATER DUMP REQUIRES USE OF
FLUID STORAGE THUS 3/2R CRITICALITY, NOT LOSS OF
THE NASA VIEWED ANY LOSS OF WATER DUMP CAPABILITY, EITHER SUPPLY
OR WASTE WATER, AS A LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE CONDITION. HOWEVER
THE IOA ANALYSIS DID NOT RECOGNIZE THIS LIMITATION AND VIEWED THE
LOSS OF WASTE WATER DUMP CAPABILITY TO
BE ONLY A LOSS OF MISSION CONDITION.
INCORPORATE REVISED CRITICALITY AS RECOMMENDED. IN THE STRICTEST
SENSE THIS SHOULD HAVE A DUAL CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR WASTE H20
AND 3/IR FOR SUPPLY H20, THUS THE 3/IR APPLIES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA FM: SHORTED TO GROUND
NASA FM: OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF SWITCH ELIMINATES WASTE WATER DUMP
CAPABILITY THRU THE NORMAL CHANNELS, BUT DUMP CAN STILL BE DONE
THRU THE SUPPLY WATER SYSTEM. IF THE FAILURE OCCURS DURING A
VALVE OPEN PHASE, THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE CAN OCCUR IF THE
DUMP ISOLATION VALVE ALSO FAILS - THUS A CRITICALITY OF 3/IR PNP.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED
THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE
THREATENING CONDITION. INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY. IN THE
STRICTEST SENSE THIS SHOULD HAVE A DUAL CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR
WASTE H20 AND 3/IR FOR SUPPLY H20, THUS THE 3/IR APPLIES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VE-2024-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA FM: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
NASA FM: OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF SWITCH ELIMINATES WASTE WATER DUMP
CAPABILITY THRU THE NORMAL CHANNELS, BUT DUMP CAN STILL BE DONE
THRU THE SUPPLY WATER SYSTEM. IF THE FAILURE OCCURS DURING A
VALVE OPEN PHASE, THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE CAN OCCUR IF THE
DUMP ISOLATION VALVE ALSO FAILS - THUS A CRITICALITY OF 3/IR PNP.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED
THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE
THREATENING CONDITION. INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY. IN THE
STRICTEST SENSE THIS SHOULD HAVE A DUAL CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR
WASTE H20 AND 3/IR FOR SUPPLY H20, THUS THE 3/IR APPLIES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2024-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
NASA FM: OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND WHILE VALVE CLOSED.
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF SWITCH ELIMINATES WASTE WATER DUMP
CAPABILITY THRU NORMAL CHANNELS. IF THE FAILURE OCCURS DURING A
VALVE CLOSED PHASE, THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE CAN OCCUR IF
THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE ALSO FAILS-THUS A CRITICALITY OF 3/IR
PNP.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED THE FIRST
FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE THREATENING
CONDITION. INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY. IN THE STRICTEST
SENSE THIS SHOULD HAVE A DUAL CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR WASTE H20
AND 3/IR FOR SUPPLY H20, THUS THE 3/IR APPLIES.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0418-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






VACUUM VENT NOZZLE (I)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: THIS MAY BE DETERMINED TO BE A "NON-CREDIBLE"
CONDITION OF BLOCKED FLOW IN THE VACUUM VENT LINE, HOWEVER IF
PLAUSIBLE A POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE ENVIRONMENT DUE TO HYDROGEN GAS
CONCENTRATIONS WOULD BE POSSIBLE, HENCE THE 1/l CRITICALITY.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. A SECOND FAILURE
WHICH INDUCES 02 INTO THE ENVIRONMENT IS REQUIRED TO PRODUCE AN
EXPLOSIVE ENVIRONMENT.














VACUUM VENT LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT (2)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION.
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
REVISE CRITICALITY TO 3/3. THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ASSESSED
AGAINST 06-2E-0424 & 0425. THE FAILURE OF THE THERMOSTAT EITHER
CLOSED OR OPEN DOES NOT CREATE A PROBLEM. WHEN CLOSED THE
WATTAGE IS NOT SUFFICIENT ENOUGH TO OVER TEMP THE LINE AND IF
OPEN THE
REDUNDANT HEATER IS AVAILABLE ALTHOUGH THE GAS FLOWING THROUGH
THIS 2 INCH LINE ACTUALLY DOES NOT REQUIRE HEATING. IF H20 IS
INDUCED IN THE LINE (i.e. H2 SEPARATOR FAILURE) THE HEATER IS TO
SMALL TO STOP FREEZING.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2006-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
IOA COMMENT: IF THE POSSIBILITY FOR LINE FREEZING IS ACCEPTED,
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE VACUUM VENT HEATERS, THEN LOSS OF THE
HEATERS COULD CAUSE LINE FREEZING AND A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS GAS
ENVIRONMENT.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE HEATER IS
SIZED TO KEEP ANY FROST FROM BUILDING UP IN THE DUCT. THE
MOISTURE (VERY LOW LEVEL) IS VENTED OVERBOARD FROM THE COMMODE OR
THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. ANY FREEZING IN THIS CASE WOULD NOT
COMPLETELY BLOCK FLOW NOR WOULD THE ICE BUILD UP BE SIGNIFICANT.











NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (i)









HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA FM: ELECTRICAL OPEN
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION.
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE HEATER IS
SIZED TO KEEP ANY FROST FROM BUILDING UP IN THE DUCT. THE
MOISTURE (VERY LOW LEVEL) IS VENTED OVERBOARD FROM THE COMMODE OR
THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. ANY FREEZING IN THIS CASE WOULD NOT
COMPLETELY BLOCK FLOW NOR WOULD THE ICE BUILD UP BE SIGNIFICANT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VE-2411-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA FM: SHORTED. NASA FM: OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND.
IOA COMMENT: IF THE POSSIBILITY FOR LINE FREEZING IS ACCEPTED,
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE VACUUM VENT HEATERS, THEN LOSS OF THE
HEATERS COULD CAUSE LINE FREEZING AND A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS GAS
ENVIRONMENT.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE HEATER IS
SIZED TO KEEP ANY FROST FROM BUILDING UP IN THE DUCT. THE
MOISTURE (VERY LOW LEVEL) IS VENTED OVERBOARD FROM THE COMMODE OR
THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. ANY FREEZING IN THIS CASE WOULD NOT
COMPLETELY BLOCK FLOW NOR WOULD THE ICE BUILD UP BE SIGNIFICANT.











NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (I)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA FM: SHORTED. NASA FM: OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND.
IOA COMMENT: IF THE POSSIBILITY FOR LINE FREEZING IS ACCEPTED,
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE VACUUM VENT HEATERS, THEN LOSS OF THE
HEATERS COULD CAUSE LINE FREEZING AND A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS GAS
ENVIRONMENT.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE HEATER IS
SIZED TO KEEP ANY FROST FROM BUILDING UP IN THE DUCT. THE
MOISTURE (VERY LOW LEVEL) IS VENTED OVERBOARD FROM THE COMMODE OR
THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. ANY FREEZING IN THIS CASE WOULD NOT
COMPLETELY BLOCK FLOW NOR WOULD THE ICE BUILD UP BE SIGNIFICANT.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0425-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






VACUUM VENT NOZZLE HEATER (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA FM: ELECTRICAL OPEN, SHORT. NASA FM: OPEN. NOTE: THE
NASA CRITICALITY WERE 2R/3 DURING A PREVIOUS ANALYSIS.
IOA COMMENT: IF THE POSSIBILITY FOR LINE FREEZING IS ACCEPTED,
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE VACUUM VENT HEATERS, THEN LOSS OF THE
HEATERS COULD CAUSE LINE FREEZING AND A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS GAS
ENVIRONMENT.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE HEATER IS
SIZED TO KEEP ANY FROST FROM BUILDING UP IN THE DUCT. THE
MOISTURE (VERY LOW LEVEL) IS VENTED OVERBOARD FROM THE COMMODE OR
THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. ANY FREEZING IN THIS CASE WOULD NOT
COMPLETELY BLOCK FLOW NOR WOULD THE ICE BUILD UP BE SIGNIFICANT.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0443-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WCSCHECKVALVE LINES TO WWSQD




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY
NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE
ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE
NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB AND UCD ARE
ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN THE
STRICKEST SENSE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0445-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FAN/SEPARATOR MUFFLER HOUSING INLET DUCT
LEAD ANALYST : K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: NOT VIEWED AS IMMEDIATE MISSION CRITICAL BECAUSE OF
FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLY USAGE MAY CREATE A
LOSS OF MISSION DEPENDING ON MISSION DURATION DUE TO LACK OF
SUPPLIES.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED THE FIRST
FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE THREATENING
CONDITION.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB AND UCD ARE
ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN THE
STRICKEST SENSE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0445-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MUFFLER HOUSING ASSEMBLY (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: NOT VIEWED AS IMMEDIATE MISSION CRITICAL BECAUSE OF
FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLY USAGE MAY CREATE A
LOSS OF MISSION DEPENDING ON MISSION DURATION DUE TO LACK OF
SUPPLIES.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED THE FIRST
FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE THREATENING
CONDITION.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB AND UCD ARE
ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN THE
STRICKEST SENSE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WASTE DUMP VALVE SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: SHORTED TO GROUND
IOA COMMENT: THE FIRST FAILURE IS POTENTIAL PROBLEM IF VALVE
OPEN AT FAILURE BECAUSE OF LOST CONTINGENCY DUMP CAPABILITY.
POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE IF DUMP ISOLATION VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE IF
DUMP VALVE IS OPEN AT FAILURE, THUS CRITICALITY 2/IR PNP.
THE DISAGREEMENT IN THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS WAS DUE TO NO DETAILED
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGERS REGARDING THE
REDUNDANT PATHS.
INCORPORATE REVISED CRITICALITY AS RECOMMENDED FOR THE WASTE
WATER DUMP CONSIDERATIONS AND ADD 3/IR PPP CRITICALITY FOR SUPPLY
WATER DUMP CONSIDERATIONS. CONSISTENT WITH ALL OTHER WASTE WATER
DUMP COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2000-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







CB-SMOKE DETN BAY 2A/3B, IB/3A, IA/2B (CB8, 7,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PER NSTS-222006 (CN 4) PARAGRAPH 2.3.5A SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE
THE SENSORS ARE OPERATING DURING LOS. VISUAL OPEN STATE OF
CIRCUIT BREAKERS IS NOT CONSIDERED DETECTABLE. A POSSIBLE
ADDITION TO THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION OUTPUT WOULD BE TO TRIGGER
FDA IF THE OUTPUT FAILS TO ZERO, INDICATING LOSS OF POWER TO THE
SENSOR.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION.
SINCE DETECTABILITY IS AVAILABLE WITH STATION COVERAGE AND THE
ITEM IS ALREADY A CIL IT APPEARS THE ITEM HAS BEEN GIVEN
SUFFICIENT VISABILITY WITHIN THE CCB AND PRCB.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2000-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CB-SMOKE DETN L/R FLT DECK (CB7)




HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELE_)




PER NSTS-22206 (CN 4) PARAGRAPH 2.3.5A SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE T?/E
SENSORS ARE OPERATING DURING LOS. VISUAL OPEN STATE OF CIRCUIT
BREAKERS IS NOT CONSIDERED DETECTABLE. A POSSIBLE ADDITION TO
THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION OUTPUT WOULD BE TO TRIGGER FDA IF THE
OUTPUT FAILS TO ZERO, INDICATING LOSS OF POWER TO SENSOR.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION.
SINCE DETECTABILITY IS AVAILABLE WITH STATION COVERAGE AND TH_
ITEM IS ALREADY A CIL IT APPEARS THE ITEM HAS BEEN GIVEN
SUFFICIENT VISABILITY WITHIN THE CCB AND PRCB.











CB-SMOKE DETN CABIN (CB6)











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PER NSTS-22206 (CN 4) PARAGRAPH 2.3.5A SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE THE
SENSORS ARE OPERATING DURING LOS. VISUAL OPEN STATE OF CIRCUIT
BREAKERS IS NOT CONSIDERED DETECTABLE. A POSSIBLE ADDITION TO
THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION OUTPUT WOULD BE TO TRIGGER FDA IF THE
OUTPUT FAILS TO ZERO, INDICATING LOSS OF POWER TO THE SENSOR.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION.
SINCE DETECTABILITY IS AVAILABLE WITH STATION COVERAGE AND THE
ITEM IS ALREADY A CIL IT APPEARS THE ITEM HAS BEEN GIVEN
SUFFICIENT VISABILITY WITHIN THE CCB AND PRCB.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2075-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







RESISTOR AIRI, R2, R3, R4, R5, R8, R9, RI0, RII




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ALARM STILL WILL BE ISSUED VIA THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION FDA
PARAMETER AND THE APPROPRIATE FIRE LIGHT WILL ILLUMINATE.
NASA CRITICALITY CHANGED TO AGREE WITH IOA CRITICALITY (B SCREEN,
P). THE ACCUMULATED RESULTS TABLE (SMOKE) DATED 3/14/88
INDICATES THE LATEST NASA ANALYSIS AGREES WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2251-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE AICRI, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, ii




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE IS DETECTED BY THE SMOKE DETECTOR CONCENTRATION FDA
ALERT AND SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION. THE
IOA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED THE FAILURE DETECTABLE AND ISOLATABLE
UPON SENSOR ACTIVATION, WHERE-AS NASA CONSIDERED IT NON-
DETECTABLE BECAUSE IT COULD BE IN EXISTANCE A LONG TIME BEFORE
THE SENSOR IS ACTIVATED. THIS IS ANOTHER CASE OF THE APPLICATION
OF DETECTABILITY AS DEFINED IN NSTS-22206. IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA
ANALYSIS BASED UPON THE HIGHER CRITICALITY WHICH PROVIDES EVEN
GREATER VISABILITY INTO THE FAILURE AND ITS EFFECTS.











RESISTOR A6RII, RI2 (I.2K)




_EW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THESE RESISTORS ONLY EFFECT THE PAYLOAD SMOKE DETECTION ALL OTHER
ALARMS WORK TO INDIACTE THE FIRE. BUT THE LOSS OF ALL LIKE AND
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY (ALL ALARM OUTPUTS) COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN
LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHCILE.
NASA CRITCALITY CHANGED TO AGREE WITH IOA CRITI_TY (B SCREEN,
P). THE ACCUMULATED RESULTS TABLE (SMOKE) DATED 3/14/88
INDICATES THE LATEST NASA ANALYSIS AGREES WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS.























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)




ALL OTHER ALARMS WORK TO INDICATE THE FIRE AND THE SOURCE CAN BE
IDENTIFIED BY SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION. THE
IOA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED THE FAILURE DETECTABLE AND ISOLATABLE
UPON SENSOR ACTIVATION, WHERE-AS NASA CONSIDERED IT NON-
DETECTABLE BECAUSE IT COULD BE IN EXISTANCE A LONG TIME BEFORE
THE SENSOR IS ACTIVATED. THIS IS ANOTHER CASE OF THE APPLICATION
OF DETECTABILITY AS DEFINED IN NSTS-22206. IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA
ANALYSIS BASED UPON THE HIGHER CRITICALITY WHICH PROVIDES EVEN
GREATER VISABILITY INTO THE FAILURE AND ITS EFFECTS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2311-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SMOKE DETECTION LIGHT MATRIX-LAMPS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE CAN BE DETECTED INFLIGHT WHEN ALARMS ANNUNCIATE THE FIRE
BUT LIGHT DOES NOT. SOFTWARE FDA PROVIDES SOURCE OF FIRE.
NASA CRITICALITY CHANGED TO AGREE WITH IOA CRITICALITY (B SCREEN,
P). THE ACCUMULATED RESULTS TABLE (SMOKE) DATED 3/14/88
INDICATES THE LATEST NASA ANALYSIS WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POST LAUNCH, OPEN ACTUALLY ISOLATES THE GROUND CIRCUIT BETTER
THAN ANY OTHER CONDITION AND DOES NOT EFFECT THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT
PRE-LAUNCH THE CIRCUIT PROVIDES CAPABILITY TO FIGHT A FIRE
THROUGH GROUND COMMAND CAPABILITIES. THIS DIODE, THE ON BOARD
CIRCUIT, AND THE PORTABLE BOTTLES MUST FAILS TO RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE. CONSIDERATIONS OF PREMATURE FIRING ARE ACTUALLY A
FAIL SAFE CONDITION.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE IOA ASSESSMENT RATIONALE THAT CONSIDERED USE OF THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHER AS ANOTHER BACKUP IS SUSPECT. IN THE VERTICAL
POSITION THE REACH FROM THE AFT AREA TO THE AV BAY FIRE PORTS IS
RATHER DIFFICULT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2073-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT THUS THE ONLY
CONSIDERATION IS ON THE LAUNCH PAD. FAILURE OF THE GROUND
SYSTEMS TO DISCHARGE THE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER IS BACKED UP BY
THE FLIGHT SYSTEM, PORTABLE BOTTLES, AND LAUNCH TOWER FIRE
SYSTEMS.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE IOA ASSESSMENT RATIONALE THAT CONSIDERED USE OF THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHER AS ANOTHER BACKUP IS SUSPECT. IN THE VERTICAL
POSITION THE REACH FROM THE AFT AREA TO THE AV BAY FIRE PORTS IS
RATHER DIFFICULT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2302-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PYRO CONTROLLER NO. I, 2, 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A PREMATURE OPERATION OF THIS CIRCUIT (SHORT INTERNAL) CAN
INHIBIT THE ACTUAL FIRE VOLTAGE BY NOT ALLOWING THE CAPACITOR
VOLTAGE TO BUILD UP. THUS THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY IS I/i. IF
THE NSI CAN FIRE AT A LOWER VOLTAGE OR IF THE FAILURE FIRES THE
NSI PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL FIRE COMMAND THE FAILURE WOULD BE A
CRITICALITY 3/3 SINCE THE DESIRE RESULTS ARE ACHIEVED.
NASA CRITICALITY CHANGED TO AGREE WITH IOA RECOMMENDED
CRITICALITY. IOA REMARKS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY NASA SUBSYTEM
MANAGER FOR THE BASIC EPD&C COMPONENTS.






NASA FMEA #: 06-2-330001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY (9)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE REQUIRES MORE THOUGHT THAN ONE FMEA/CIL: i) THE
FAILURE BY ITSELF SHOULD BE INDICATED BY ILLUMINATION OF THE
AGENT DISCHARGE LIGHT. UPON DISCHARGE (ASSUMING A HIGH LEAD
RATE) THE AV BAY WOULD BE PROTECTED FOR UP TO 50 HRS. THUS THE
FAILURE ONLY HAS MISSION TERMINATION EFFECTS AND LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE ARE NOT THE CONCERN; 2) THE FAILURE ASSUMING A SLOW
LEAK WOULD REDUCE THIS AV BAY PROTECTION TIME BUT DETECTION WOULD
STILL BE INDICATED VIA THE AGENT DISCHARGE LIGHT. IF THE RATE
IS SLOW ENOUGH IT WILL BE DETECTED BY GROUND CHECKOUT BETWEEN
MISSION; 3) THE MAJOR PROBLEM IS IF FOLLOWING GROUND CHECKOUT THE
RESISTOR THAT PROVIDES CURRENT LIMITING FOR THE CIRCUIT FAILS
OPEN OR THE PRESSURE SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED, OR THE
CIRCUIT IS SHORTED TO GROUND NO AGENT DISCHARGE LIGHT
ILLUMINATION CAN TAKE PLACE AND THEN THIS FAILURE CAN BE
CATASTROPHIC IF THE LEAK IS UNDETECTED AND COMPLETE PRIOR TO
LIFT-OFF. THUS THE FAILURE WOULD APPEAR AS A IR/2.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE. SINCE THE LEAK OF THE BOTTLE COULD
RESULT IN NO SUPPRESSANT TO FIGHT A SUBSEQUENT FIRE AND
CREW/VEHICLE ARE AT RISK. IOA ACCEPTS THE HIGHER CRITICALITY
BASED ON GREATER VISABILITY.





NASA FMEA #: 06-2-371000-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PORTABLE FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A JAMMED ACTUATOR WILL BE KNOW IMMEDIATELY UPON USAGE.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE. SINCE THE DIFFERENCE IN SCREEN B HAS NO
EFFECT ON THE ANALYSIS OUTCOME THE NASA ANALYSIS IS CONSIDERED
GOOD.














HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE III) (3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT THUS THE ONLY
CONSIDERATION IS ON THE LAUNCH PAD. FAILURE OF THE GROUND
SYSTEMS TO DISCHARGE THE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER IS BACKED UP BY
THE FLIGHT SYSTEM, PORTABLE BOTTLES, AND LAUNCH TOWER FIRE
SYSTEMS.
WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
THE IOA ASSESSMENT RATIONALE THAT CONSIDERED USE OF THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHER AS ANOTHER BACKUP IS SUSPECT. IN THE VERTICAL
POSITION THE REACH FROM THE AFT AREA TO THE AV BAY FIRE PORTS IS
RATHER DIFFICULT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2203-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) (3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT THUS THE ONLY
CONSIDERATION IS ON THE LAUNCH PAD. FAILURE OF THE GROUND
SYSTEMS TO DISCHARGE THE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER IS BACKED UP BY
THE FLIGHT SYSTEM, PORTABLE BOTTLES, AND LAUNCH TOWER FIRE
SYSTEMS.
WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
THE IOA ASSESSMENT RATIONALE THAT CONSIDERED USE OF THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHER AS ANOTHER BACKUP IS SUSPECT. IN THE VERTICAL
POSITION THE REACH FROM THE AFT AREA TO THE AV BAY FIRE PORTS IS
RATHER DIFFICULT.














SW-FIRE SUPPRESSION AV BAY i, 2, 3 AGENT DISCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ A ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE COUPLED WITH A FAILURE OF THE ONE SECOND TIME DELAY
CAN INHIBIT THE DISCHANGE OF THE FIRE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER.
WORST CASE IS DURING ASCENT AND DEORBIT.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE FAILURE OF THE ONE SECOND TIME DELAY IS NOT CONSIDERED A
CREDIBLE FAILURE FOR THAT DEVICE. THUS THE CIRCUIT IS SUCH THAT
THE CAPACITOR BANK WILL CHARGE UP AND DISCHARGE EVEN WITH THIS
FAILURE. THE DIFFERENCE IN OPERATION IS THAT THE AGENT DISCH SW
DOES NOT NEED TO BE DEPRESSED.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




THE AS RUN GROUND TURNAROUND TEST UNDER MOST CONDITIONS WILL NOT
DETECT THE FAILURE.
NASA CRITICALITY CHANGED TO AGREE WITH IOA CRITICALITY (A SCREEN,
F). THE ACCUMULATED RESULTS TABLE (SMOKE) DATED 3/14/88
INDICATES THE LATEST NASA ANALYSIS AGREES WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2203-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) (3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PRELAUNCH PORTABLE BOTTLES ARE AVAILABLE TO DISCHARGE SUPPRESSANT
INTO THE BAY. THIS IS ALSO TRUE FOR ONORBIT AND LANDING/SAFING.
DURING LIFT OFF AND DEORBIT, A FAILURE OF THE PRE-FLIGHT BUS
WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ISSUE THE COMMAND VIA THIS FAILURE.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE IOA ASSESSMENT RATIONALE THAT CONSIDERED USE OF THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHER AS ANOTHER BACKUP IS SUSPECT. IN THE VERTICAL
POSITION THE REACH FROM THE AFT AREA TO THE AV BAY FIRE PORTS IS
RATHER DIFFICULT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2201-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) - SMOKEDETECTORGROUND




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE IS DETECTABLE THROUGH THE REDUNDANT SENSING
CAPABILITY.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION. THE
IOA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED THE FAILURE DETECTABLE AND ISOLATABLE
UPON SENSOR ACTIVATION; WHERE-AS NASA CONSIDERED IT NON-
DETECTABLE BECAUSE IT COULD BE IN EXISTANCE A LONG TIME BEFORE
THE SENSOR IS ACTIVATED. THIS IS ANOTHER CASE OF THE APPLICATION
OF DETECTABILITY AS DEFINED IN NSTS-22206. IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA
ANALYSIS BASED UPON THE HIGHER CRITICALTY WHICH PROVIDES EVEN
GREATER VISABILITY INTO THE FAILURE AND ITS EFFECTS.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




DURING GROUND TURNAROUND TEST THE ONLY TRUE TEST OF THE
CONCENTRATION PARAMETER WOULD BE TO VERIFY A KNOWN CONCENTRATION
LEVEL WHICH THE PROCEDURES DO NOT ATTEMPT. SIMILAR LOGIC APPLIES
TO THE INFLIGHT CASE.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE ISSUE AS DEFINED IS BASED ON A MIS-MATCH OF FAILURES. THE
NASA FAILURE IS AN ABSOLUTE FAILURE OF THE CONCENTRATION OUTPUT
(i.e. THE SIGNAL THAT IS THE CONCENTRATION LEVEL SENSED INTERNAL
TO THE SENSOR). THE IOA FAILURE CONSIDERED THE SENSOR COULD
NOT DETECT CHANGES IN CONSENTRATION LEVEL AND ONLY OUTPUT A
CONSTANT VALUE WHICH INDICATION WOULD BE GIVEN. BASED UPON THE
CONFUSION AND HIGHER CRITICALITY THE NASA CRITICALITY IS
ACCEPTED.











EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE LIST NASA CRITICALTIY. THE
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS HARDWARE DEPENDS ON HOW THE
INSTRUCTIONS IN NSTS 22206 ARE INTERPRETED AND WHETHER THE
FAILURE EFFECT IS LOSS OF PLANNED OR LOSS OF CONTINGENCY EVA
CAPABILITY. FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES THAT THE TWO EMU
WATER SUPPLY VALVES PROVIDE SOME DEGREE IF REDUNDANCY WHICH
SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY. ALSO, THE
WORST CASE SCENARIO WOULD BE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF EVA CONTINGENCY CAPABILTIY. THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS
WITH THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION, PASSAGE OF A AND C SCREENS, AND
EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.











EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5005. LOSS OF THE FUNCTION TO SEAL THE WATER
ON THE LINE DOES NOT LEAD TO LOSS OF FES. A REVALVING OF THE
SUPPLY WATER SYSTEM WILL CORRECT THE FAILURE; HOWEVER EVA
MISSIONS ARE STILL LOST.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY.
BOTH NASA/RI AND IOA ANALYSIS AGREE THAT THE HARDWARE FAILURE
MODE SHOULD BE INCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM. THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE
IR FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY ASSIGNED BY NASA/RI IF THE FAILURE
EFFECT IS CONSIDERED TO BE LOSS OF CONTINGENCY EVA CAPABILITY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2008-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EMU WATER SUPPLY SWITCH (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5006. FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS OF DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE
THE LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION
NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT
#5003, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION, PASSAGE
OF SCREENS A AND C, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2008-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EMU WATER SUPPLY SWITCH (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5006. FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION
NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT
#5003, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION, PASSAGE
OF SCREENS A AND C, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2000-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EMU WATER SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SAME SCENARIO (WORST CASE) AS FOR VALVE FAILED CLOSED (#5003).
NASA DATA IS NOT AVAILABLE, BUT IOA & NASA'A CRITICALITIES ARE
CONSISTENT WITH #5003 & 06-IA-1206-I THUS, THE ISSUE FOLLOWS THE
LOGIC OF ASSESSMENT #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT
#5003, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION, PASSAGE
OF SCREENS A AND C, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.











EMU WASTE WATER VALVE (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOa [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5011. PRE 51-L ANALYSIS SAYS LOSS OF
REDUNDANCY. HOWEVER, WITH TWO SUITED CREWMAN, THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE TWO WMU WASTE
WATER VALVES DO PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. THIS SHOULD BE REFLECTED BY
ASSIGNING EITHER A 3/IR OR 3/2R CRITICALITY DEPENDING ON WHETHER
THE FAILURE "EFFECT IS CONSIDERED LOSS OF CONTINGENCY OR LOSS
OF PLANNED EVA CAPABILITY. SINCE ALL SCREENS PASS, THE FAILURE
MODE WILL BE EXCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM. THEREFORE, THE IOA
ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE NASA/RI EVALUATION IS ACCEPTABLE.











EMU WASTE WATER SWITCH (2)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SAME SCENARIO (WORST CASE) AS FOR VALVE FAILED CLOSED (#5011),
(NASA 06-1-1212-1). WITH TWO SUITED CREWMAN THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FUTHER REVIEW, AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH ASSESSMENT #50011,
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE NASA/RI EVALUATION IS ACCEPTABLE
AND THAT THE FAILURE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM.














NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]









[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SAME SCENARIO (WORST CASE) AS FOR VALVE FAILED CLOSED (#5011),
(NASA 06-1-1212-1). WITH TWO SUITED CREWMAN THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY, THUS MISSION LOSS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FUTHER REVIEW, AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH ASSESSMENT #50011,
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE NASA/RI EVALUATION IS ACCEPTABLE
AND THAT THE FAILURE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EMU WASTE WATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5017. ASSUMING TWO CREWMEN THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY FOR EACH CREWMEN. THUS LOSS OF CB FORCES THE VALVE TO
REMAIN CLOSED AND LOSS OF MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FUTHER REVIEW, AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH ASSESSMENT #50011,
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE NASA/RI EVALUATION IS ACCEPTABLE
AND THAT THE FAILURE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1208-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EMU WATER SUPPLY LINES AND FITTING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5020. FUNCTIONAL LOSS LEADS TO INABILITY TO
SERVICE THE EMU'S. HOWEVER, AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY ITEM.
FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION SEE ASSESSMENT #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH ASSESSMENT #5003,
THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION, PASSAGE OF ALL
SCREENS, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.














02 SUPPLY LINES AND FITTINGS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO EXISTING EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA WAS FOUND FOR THIS FAILURE (SEE
IOA ANALYSIS #5022).
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE.
THIS SHOULD HAVE REFERENCED NASA FMEA # 06-IC-1510-I WHICH SHOWS
A CRITICALTIY OF I/i. SINCE IT COMBINES ALL LINES & FITTINGS
THAT IS THE WORST CASE CRITICALTIY. WHEN THE AIRLOCK IS
CONSIDERED BY ITSELF THE CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO ISOLATION
CAPABILITIES. THUS THE IOA ANALYSIS WAS TO A FINER LEVEL AND
BOTH THE NASA AND IOA CRITICALITIES ARE CORRECT.











EMU 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5025. ASSUMING A BASELINE OF TWO SUITED
CREWMEMBERS AND NO CREW ACTION (RULE 2.3.3.f OF NSTS 22206). TWO
CREWMEMBERS SHARING ONE SCU IS NOT A "NOMINAL CREW ACTION", THUS
LOSS OF MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THIS FAILURE IS ANALOGOUS
TO THE EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE FAILURE ADDRESSED IN ASSESSMENT #
5003. IT SHOULD BE ASSIGNED A 3/2R CRITICALITY AND EXCLUDED AS A
CIL ITEM SINCE ALL REDUDNANCY SCREENS ARE PASSED. THIS
FAILURE IS SIMILIAR TO THAT LISTED IN LS-5017.











EMU02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_ [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5026. LOSS OF 02 ISOLATION FUNCTION LEADS TO
LOSS OF EVA AND SHUTTLE MISSION. THIS IS BECAUSE LV3 AND LV4
WOULD BE CLOSED, AND THIS ACTION ISOLATES THE LEH'S. THUS, UPON
FUNCTION LOSS, THE MISSION IS TERMINATED AND DEORBIT PLANNED
FOR THE NEXT PLS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE NASA/RI ANALYSIS OF THIS FAILURE
MODE REPRESENTS A MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN NSTS 22206. THEREFORE,
THE NASA EVALUATION IS ACCEPTABLE AND THE INCLUSION OF THE EMU 02
SUPPLY VALVE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM IS
APPROPRIATE.











DEPRESS CAP VENT (I)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE TWO EQUALIZATION
VALVES ON THE AIRLOCK HATCH LEADING TO THE PAYLOAD BAY PROVIDE
REDUNDANCY TO THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CONTINGENCY EVA;
THEREFORE, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION,
PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A
CIL ITEM.











CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREEN (i)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE TWO EQUALIZATION
VALVES ON THE AIRLOCK HATCH LEADING TO THE PAYLOAD BAY PROVIDE
REDUNDANCY TO THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CONTINGENCY EVA;
THEREFORE, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION,
PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A
CIL ITEM.











CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREEN (i)
LEAD ANALYST : R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE TWO EQUALIZATION
VALVES ON THE AIRLOCK HATCH LEADING TO THE PAYLOAD BAY PROVIDE
REDUNDANCY TO THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CONTINGENCY EVA;
THEREFORE, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION,
PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A
CIL ITEM.











DEPRESS VALVE/CAP (i EACH)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE MORE CONSERVATIVE EVALUATION OF THIS
FAILURE MODE BY NASA/RI AND THE INCLUSION OF THE FAILURE MODE AS
A CIL ITEM.












LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE TWO EQUALIZATION
VALVES ON THE AIRLOCK HATCH LEADING TO THE PAYLOAD BAY PROVIDE
REDUNDANCY TO THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CONTINGENCY EVA;
THEREFORE, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION,
PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A
CIL ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1603-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT CAP (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5035. NASA FMEA NOT AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, THERE
ARE ONLY TWO EQUALIZATION VALVES, THUS ONLY TWO PIECES OF
HARDWARE THAT CAN ALLOW REPRESSURIZATION OF THE AIRLOCK AFTER AN
EVA.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION.
THE EQUALIZATION CAPS ARE REMOVED PRIOR TO THE START OF AN EVA,
THEREFORE THE WORST CASE EFFECT OF AN INABILITY TO REMOVE THE
CAPS ON THE AIRLOCK TO CABIN HATCH WOULD BE LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA. THREE PATHS EXIST, THE
DEPRESS VALVE AND TWO EQUALIZATION VALVE/CAPS.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1603-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT CAP (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5035. NASA FMEA NOT AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, THERE
ARE ONLY TWO EQUALIZATION VALVES, THUS ONLY TWO PIECES OF
HARDWARE THAT CAN ALLOW REPRESSURIZATION OF THE AIRLOCK AFTER AN
EVA.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION.
THE EQUALIZATION CAPS ARE REMOVED PRIOR TO THE START OF AN EVA,
THEREFORE THE WORST CASE EFFECT OF AN INABILITY TO REMOVE THE
CAPS ON THE AIRLOCK TO CABIN HATCH WOULD BE LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA. THREE PATHS EXIST, THE
DEPRESS VALVE AND TWO EQUALIZATION VALVE/CAPS.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1603-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT CAP (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION SINCE THE VALVE IS AN UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY TO THE CAP. HOWEVER THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY
PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION SEE ASSESSMENT
#LS-5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES THE WORST SCENARIO WOULD BE
LOSS OF CONTINGENCY EVA CAPABILITY (IR FUNCTIONAL CRITICALTIY).
TO BE CONSISTANT WITH OTHER ANALOGOUS AIRLOCK COMPONENT FAILURES,
THE IOA WOULD ASSIGN A LEVEL 3 CRITICALITY TO THE HARDWARE
FAILURE. HOWEVER, SINCE THE NASA/RI EVALUATION REPRESENTS A MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF GROUNDRULES
CONTAINED IN NSTS 22206, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE 2/IR
CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION OF THE HARDWARE FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1601-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK TO CABIN EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WORST CASE SCENARIO HARDWARE LOSS IS VALVE OPEN, CAP DOES NOT
MATE. EVA MISSION IS CALLED SHORT/OFF AND FURTHER MISSIONS ARE
CANCELLED. THUS FUNCTION LOSS IS LOSS OF EVA MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES THE WORST SCENARIO WOULD BE
LOSS OF CONTINGENCY EVA CAPABILITY (IR FUNCTIONAL CRITICALTIY).
TO BE CONSISTANT WITH OTHER ANALOGOUS AIRLOCK COMPONENT FAILURES,
THE IOA WOULD ASSIGN A LEVEL 3 CRITICALITY TO THE HARDWARE
FAILURE. HOWEVER, SINCE THE NASA/RI EVALUATION REPRESENTS A MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF GROUNDRULES
CONTAINED IN NSTS 22206, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE 2/IR
CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION OF THE HARDWARE FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1601-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK TO CABIN EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES NSTS 22206. FOR IOA
ANALYSIS SEE THE LIFE SUPPORT ID# 5041.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
WOULD BE LOSS OF CONTINGENCY EVA CAPABILITY (IR FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY). TO BE CONSISTANT WITH OTHER ANALOGOUS AIRLOCK
COMPONENT FAILURES, THE IOA WOULD ASSIGN A LEVEL 3 CRITICALITY TO
THE HARDWARE FAILURE. HOWEVER, SINCE THE NASA/RI EVALUATION
REPRESENTS A MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
GROUND RULES CONTAINED IN NSTS 22206, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE
I/I CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION OF THE HARDWARE FAILURE AS A CIL
ITEM.






NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1604-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK TO CABIN PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WORST CASE SCENARIO HARDWARE LOSS IS VALVE OPEN, CAP DOES NOT
MATE. EVA MISSION IS CALLED SHORT/OFF AND FURTHER MISSIONS ARE
CANCELLED. THUS FUNCTION LOSS IS LOSS OF EVA MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION
THAT THIS FAILURE MODE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA WHICH PER OPERATIONS GROUND RULES IS
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY I.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1605-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK TO CABIN PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




WORST CASE SCENARIO HARDWARE LOSS IS VALVE OPEN, CAP DOES NOT
MATE. EVA MISSION IS CALLED SHORT/OFF AND FURTHER MISSIONS ARE
CANCELLED. THUS FUNCTION LOSS IS LOSS OF EVA MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION
THAT THIS FAILURE MODE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA WHICH PER OPERATIONS GROUND RULES IS
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY i.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1124-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT VENT CAP (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND INCORPORATE NASA
CRITICALITY. FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE
POSSIBILITY OF THE FAILURE OCCURRING IS INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER
THE TUNNEL ADAPTER IS ATTACHED AND THAT THE EFFECT OF THIS
FAILURE MODE AND ASSOCIATED REDUNDANCY (i.e. LOSS OF AIRLOCK
REPRESS CAPABILITY) IS POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC. THEREFORE, THE
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1122-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ANALYSIS #5041 ASSUMED THE TUNNEL ADAPTER WAS ATTACHED.
WITHOUT THIS THE AIRLOCK WOULD LEAK TO SPACE FORCING EVALUATION
BY THE AIRLOCK CREW. THE LEAK CANNOT BE GREATER THAN TWO
EQUALIZATION VALVES WIDE OPEN ON THE CABIN SIDE. EACH VALVE ALSO
HAS A THREATED CAP WHICH IS CAPABLE OF A PRESSURE SEAL. WORST
CASE SCENARIO IS LOSS OF FURTHER MISSIONS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND INCORPORATE NASA
CRITICALITY. FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE
POSSIBILITY OF THE FAILURE OCCURRING IS INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER
THE TUNNEL ADAPTER IS ATTACHED AND THAT THE EFFECT OF THIS
FAILURE MODE AND ASSOCIATED REDUNDANCY (i.e. LOSS OF AIRLOCK
REPRESS CAPABILITY) IS POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC. THEREFORE, THE
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1122-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES NSTS 22206. FOR IOA
ANALYSIS SEE THE LIFE SUPPORT ID# 5041.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE INABILITY TO
PRESSURIZE THE AIRLOCK BECAUSE OF EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH THE
EQUALIZATION VALVE IS POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC (IF FAILURE OCCURS
WHILE EVA IS UNDERWAY). THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1120-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST CORRECT NASA
CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE INABILITY TO
PRESSURIZE THE AIRLOCK BECAUSE OF EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH THE
EQUALIZATION VALVE IS POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC (IF FAILURE OCCURS
WHILE EVA IS UNDERWAY). THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION.
NOTE: THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE MODE IS 2/IR
VS. 2/2 ERRONEOUSLY SHOWN ON THE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET.
(REDUNDANCY SCREENS ARE PPP).





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1121-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST CORRECT NASA
CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE INABILITY TO
PRESSURIZE THE AIRLOCK BECAUSE OF EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH THE
EQUALIZATION VALVE IS POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC (IF FAILURE OCCURS
WHILE EVA IS UNDERWAY). THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION.
NOTE: THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE MODE IS 2/IR
VS. 2/2 ERRONEOUSLY SHOWN ON THE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET.
(REDUNDANCY SCREENS ARE PPP).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2008-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER BUS SELECT SWITCH (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY TO EACH OF
THE SWITCH/SYSTEMS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST PROPER NASA
CRITICALTIY. THIS ITEM WAS INITIALLY ASSESSED AGAINST THE WRONG
CIL. THE PROPER NASA CIL LISTS A CRITICALITY OF 2R/3.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE CRITICALITY IF
THE HARDWARE FAILURE DEPENDS ON THE STATUS OF THE ASSOCIATED EMU
BATTERY AND THAT THE WORST CASE SCENARIO IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE
TO FAIL IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM EVA AFTER THE
BATTERIES ARE DEPLETED. THEREFORE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FLIGHT
CRITICALITY BE 3/2R, WITH PASSAGE OF A AND C SCREEN AND EXCLUSION
OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2008-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER BUS SELECT SWITCH (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY TO EACH OF
THE SWITCH/SYSTEMS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST PROPER NASA
CRITICALTIY. THIS ITEM WAS INITIALLY ASSESSED AGAINST THE WRONG
CIL. THE PROPER NASA CIL LISTS A CRITICALITY OF 2R/3.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE CRITICALITY IF
THE HARDWARE FAILURE DEPENDS ON THE STATUS OF THE ASSOCIATED EMU
BATTERY AND THAT THE WORST CASE SCENARIO IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE
TO FAIL IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM EVA AFTER THE
BATTERIES ARE DEPLETED. THEREFORE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FLIGHT
CRITICALITY BE 3/2R, WITH PASSAGE OF A AND C SCREEN AND EXCLUSION
OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.














EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER RPC (4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION.
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST PROPER NASA
CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE IS
DOWNGRADED FROM 2/2 TO 3/2R. THE A AND C SCREENS PASS AND B
SCREEN IS N/A. THEREFORE, THE FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS
A CIL ITEM.














EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER POWER SUPPLY (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION.
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST PROPER NASA
CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE IS
DOWNGRADED FROM 2/2 TO 3/2R. THE A AND C SCREENS PASS AND B
SCREEN IS N/A. THEREFORE, THE FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS
A CIL ITEM.














EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER POWER SUPPLY (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION.
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST PROPER NASA
CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE IS
DOWNGRADED FROM 2/2 TO 3/2R. THE A AND C SCREENS PASS AND B
SCREEN IS N/A. THEREFORE, THE FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS
A CIL ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1631-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






VACUUMVENT ISOLATION VALVE (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE CREW CAN DETECT
THE VALVE FAIL TO CLOSE FROM THE POSITION TALKBACK; THEREFORE,
SCREEN B PASSES WHICH AGREES WITH THE NASA EVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2026-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CNTRL. SWITCH (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_E [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CONTROLS WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE IOA TO BE AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF
MISSION, AS IT WAS FOR THE NASA FMEA, BUT A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL
EFFECT FOR THE FIRST FAILURE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT FAILURE OF THE
CONTROL SWITCH PLUS FAILURE OF THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE TO CLOSE
WHILE EVA IS UNDERWAY WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC. ALSO, THE SCREEN B
PASSES BECAUSE THE POSITION TALKBACK PROVIDES A FAILURE
DETECTION CAPABILITY. THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2026-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CNTRL. SWITCH (I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_ [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CONTROLS WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE IOA TO BE AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF
MISSION, AS IT WAS FOR THE NASA FMEA, BUT A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL
EFFECT FOR THE FIRST FAILURE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT FAILURE OF THE
CONTROL SWITCH PLUS FAILURE OF THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE CAN
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO VENT OR PRESSURIZE THE
AIRLOCK. THIS CAN HAVE CATASTROPHIC EFFECTS DEPENDING ON WHETHER
AN EVA IS UNDERWAY OR WHETHER IT PREVENTS A CONTINGENCY EVA FROM
BEING PERFORMED. THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AND THE INCLUSION AS A CIL ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2026-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






VACUUMVENT ISOL. VLV. CNTRL. SWITCH (I)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CONTROLS WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE IOA TO BE AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF
MISSION, AS IT WAS FOR THE NASA FMEA, BUT A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL
EFFECT FOR THE FIRST FAILURE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT FAILURE OF THE
CONTROL SWITCH PLUS FAILURE OF THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE CAN
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO VENT OR PRESSURIZE THE
AIRLOCK. THIS CAN HAVE CATASTROPHIC EFFECTS DEPENDING ON WHETHER
AN EVA IS UNDERWAY OR WHETHER IT PREVENTS A CONTINGENCY EVA FROM
BEING PERFORMED. THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AND THE INCLUSION AS A CIL ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2027-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






VACUUMVENT ISOL. VLV. BUS SELECT SWITCH (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CONTROLS WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE IOA TO BE AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF
MISSION, AS IT WAS FOR THE NASA FMEA, BUT A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL
EFFECT FOR THE FIRST FAILURE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT FAILURE OF THE BUS
SELECT SWITCH PLUS FAILURE OF THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE CAN
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO VENT OR PRESSURIZE THE
AIRLOCK. THIS CAN HAVE CATASTROPHIC EFFECTS DEPENDING ON WHETHER
AN EVA IS UNDERWAY OR WHETHER IT PREVENTS A CONTINGENCY EVA FROM
BEING PERFORMED. THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE AND THE INCLUSION AS A CIL ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2044-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ISOL. VALVE SENSORPOWERRESISTOR (A8R3 & 4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC RESISTOR VALUES ARE IN ERROR. THE VALUE
SHOULD BE 1.2K OHM, INSTEAD OF THE 5.1K OHM SHOWN FOR THE
SCHEMATIC. DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY
SUMMARY WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL
ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM REVIEW OF THE FMEA, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI
EVALUATION. END-TO-END SHORTS OF BOTH RESISTORS RESULT IN A LOSS
OF CONTROL OVER THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE. REGARDLESS OF
THE POSITION IN WHICH THE VALVE STICKS (OPEN OR CLOSED) A SIMILAR
FAILURE OF THE DEPRESS VALVE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LIFE SUPPORT
5085
EMU WATER SUPPLY STATUS INDICATOR (2)
R. DUFFY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





WITH LINE SHORTED TO GROUND, AS THE SWITCH IS MADE, THE BREAKER
WILL OPEN DUE TO HIGH DEMAND AND THE VALVE WILL NOT ACTUATE. EMU
SUIT CAN NOT BE SERVICED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION. FURTHER
ASSESSMENT CANNOT BE MADE DUE TO LACK OF NASA FMEA DATA.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT #
5003 APPROACH, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION,
PACKAGE OF SCREEN A AND C, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS
A CIL ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2013-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EMU WASTE WATER STATUS INDICATOR
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





WITH THE LINE SHORTED TO GROUND, AS THE SWITCH IS MADE, THE
BREAKER WILL OPEN DUE TO HIGH DEMAND, AND THE VALVE WILL NOT
ACTUATE. EMU SUIT CANNOT BE SERVICED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
FURTHER ASSESSMENT CANNOT BE MADE DUE TO LACK IF NASA FMEA DATA.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: INCORPORATE REVISED CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT # 5011
APPROACH, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE FAILURE SHOULD BE MISSION
CRITICAL BUT BE EXCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LIFE SUPPORT
5087
EMU WATER SUPPLY LINES & FITTINGS
R. DUFFY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P] [ P] [ P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





FUNCTIONAL LOSS LEADS TO INABILITY TO SERVICE THE EMU'S.
HOWEVER, THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY ITEM. ASSUMING AN
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS
22206.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT #
5003 APPROACH, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION,
PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A
CIL ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1402-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LCG SUPPLY & RETURN, LINES & FITTINGS




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM FUNCTION. ASSUMING A
TWO MAN CREW (BASELINE MISSION), RECOVERY CANNOT BE PERFORMED
SINCE EACH SCU CONNECTION HAS NO REDUNDANCY AND SHARING ONE SCU
WOULD BE CREW ACTION WHICH IS AGAINST SPEC NSTS 22206.
THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY ITEM. FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION
SEE ASSESSMENT #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE HIGHER LEVEL FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY
ASSIGNED BY NASA/RI. EXTERNAL LEAKAGE COULD DEPLETE THE EMU
WATER SUPPLY, CONTAMINATE THE AIRLOCK WITH FREE WATER, AND CAUSE
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1402-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LCG SUPPLY & RETURN, LINES & FITTINGS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




(RESTRICTED FLOW) LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM
FUNCTION. ASSUMING A TWO MAN CREW (BASELINE MISSION), RECOVERY
CANNOT BE PERFORMED SINCE EACH SCU CONNECTION HAS NO REDUNDANCY
AND SHARING ONE SCU WOULD BE CREW ACTION WHICH IS AGAINST SPEC
NSTS 22206. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY ITEM. FOR FURTHER
CLARIFICATION SEE ASSESSMENT #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
FOR RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE LCVG LINES & FITTINGS WOULD BE
INADEQUATE COOLING TO A STANDBY CREWMAN CONNECTED TO AN SCU
DURING A SCHEDULED OR UNSCHEDULED EVA. THEREFORE, THE IOA
CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION, PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS, AND
EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM. EVEN THOUGH
MISSION CAPABILITY IS LOST, IT WOULD STILL BE POSSIBLE FOR ONE
CREWMAN TO PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1209-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EMU WASTE WATER LINE & FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





ASSUMING A TWO MAN CREW, THE FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION SINCE
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR EACH CREWMAN.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT LOSS OF MISSION WOULD
BE WORST CASE SCENARIO BUT THAT THE SECOND SCU IN THE AIRLOCK
DOES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY FOR THE STANDBY CREWMAN DURING AN EVA.
THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION AND THE
EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1205-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






02 QUICK COUPLINGS (NOT USED FOR SCU) AND CAP
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




(INABILITY TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE). THE HARDWARE ITEMS TO
PREVENT LEAKS ARE THE VALVE, COUPLING AND CAP. FUNCTIONALLY THIS
FAILURE IS NOT IMPORTANT SINCE BY DEFINITION THIS LEAK IS
"INTERNAL". THUS THE CREW IS NOT EVEN AWARE OF THIS FAILURE.
THAT IS, BY DEFINITION "INTERNAL LEAK" MEANS NOT ALL THE SEALS
CAN FAIL (THIS WOULD BE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). INABILITY TO CLOSE IS
MOOT SINCE THE CAP WOULD NEVER BE TAKEN OFF DURING FLIGHT (CREW
USES THE SCU).
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICLAITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCURS THAT IF ALL REDUNDANT 02
SHUTOFF VALVES EXPERIENCED INTERNAL LEAKS, AND EITHER THE SCU
COUPLINGS OR CAPS LEAKED, THE 02 CONCENTATION COULD BECOME
EXCESSIVE, AN EXPLOSION OR FIRE COULD CASUE LOSS OF CREW AND
VEHICLE. THEREFORE, THE IOA AGREES THE NASA/RI EVALUATION IS
VALID AND THE HARDWARE FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE INCLUDED AS A CIL
ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1124-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT CAP
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ /NA ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





THIS FAILURE IS NOT REALISTIC SINCE THIS VALVE WOULD NOT BE USED
DURING A NORMAL MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICLAITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT IF THE OUTER HATCH
EQUALIZATION VALVES AND CAPS LEAK, IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO
REPRESSURIZE THE AIRLOCK AFTER AN EVA. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW. THE FAILURE COULD ALSO CAUSE THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA. THEREFORE, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1631-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE (I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




(EXTERNAL LEAK) THE FAILURE IS QUESTIONABLE. PER NSTS 22206 THE
LEAK CANNOT BE THROUGH THE PACKING IN THE VALVES PENETRATION.
THE ONLY OTHER PLACES COULD BE THE CASING ITSELF WHICH IS
UNREALISTIC OR THE O-RING WHICH SEALS THE VALVE TO THE BULKHEAD.
THE O-RING (LACK OF) IS NOT BIG ENOUGH TO DRAIN THE CABIN FASTER
THAN CONSUMMBLES FLOW. HOWEVER, ASSUMING CREW INABILITY TO
CORRECT THE FAILURE LEADS TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN IMMEDIATE LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO AN UNCONTROLLABLE LEAK.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A CREDIBLE EVENT. FOR THE VACUUM VENT
ISOLATION VALVE, THE LEAKAGE FLOW PATH WOULD BE FROM THE
PRESSURIZED CABIN INTO THE VALVE. THIS IS A SINGLE FAILURE POINT
PER THE NASA/RI EVALUATION. AN EXCESSIVE LEAK COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CABIN PRESSURIZATION AND THE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1630-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LINES & FITTINGS, 2 INCH DEPRESSURIZATION
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





THE LEAK CAN BE CONTROLLED WITH THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE.
LOSS OF FUNCTION CREATES A LEAK IN THE CABIN WITH POTENTIAL LOSS
OF LIFE/VEHICLE. EVEN THOUGH THE VACUUM ISOLATION VALVE HAS A
DRAIN ORIFICE, THERE IS A POTENTIAL BUILD UP OF H2 IF THE
LEAK IS DOWNSTREAM OF THE INTERFACE, WHICH ALSO HAS THE POTENTIAL
FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE IF H2 IGNITES. THUS, MISSION IS
TERMINATED ON FIRST FAILURE.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE WORST CASE EFFECT OF
THIS FAILURE MODE COULD BE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THEREFORE, THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION IS APPROPRIATE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1630-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LINES & FITTINGS, 2 INCH DEPRESSURIZATION




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




(RESTRICTED FLOW). NO CRITICALITY HAS BEEN ASSIGNED BECAUSE
THIS FAILURE IS NOT CREDIBLE. THE LINE IS 2 INCHES IN DIAMETER
AND WOULD REQUIRE LARGE SIZE DEBRIS FOR EFFECTIVE PLUGGING. ON
THE OTHER HAND, HYDROGEN IS A VERY LIGHT MOLECULE AND CAN
PERMEATE THROUGH ANY SIZE CRACK. IF IOA HAD TO ASSIGN A
CRITICALITY, IT WOULD BE A 2/2 (LOSS OF MISSION) SINCE THE
AIRLOCK WOULD BE UNABLE TO DEPRESSURIZE.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT IF FLOW THROUGH THE
TWO - INCH DEPRESSURIZATION LINES AND FITTINGS WAS RESTRICTED,
THE OUTER HATCH EQUALIZATION VALVES COULD BE USED TO DEPRESSURIZE
AIRLOCK. SINCE THIS CAPABILITY EXISTS, THE IOA WOULD ASSIGN A
3/IR CRITICALITY TO THIS FAILURE MODE FOR THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
OF LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANY WHICH PREVENTS BEING ABLE TO
PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA, BUT THE MORE CONSERVATIVE NASA
APPROACH IS ACCEPTED.















LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/NASA FM: INABILITY TO REMOVE.
IOA COMMENT: FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION AND THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY AVAILABLE.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA DETERMINED THE FAILURE MODE UNDER
REVIEW IS INABILITY TO MATE RATHER THAN INABILITY TO REMOVE. IN
ADDITION TO THE CAP, THE DEPRESS VALVE AND VACUUM VENT VALVE
PROVIDE REDUNDANT LEAKAGE PROTECTION. THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION, PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS, AND EXCLUSION OF
THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





















[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK ROTTER,
ON 5/5/88. HANK'S DATA INDICATES THAT A RUPTURE OF THIS FILTER
WILL RESULT IN THE FILTER ELEMENTS ACCUMULATING ON THE FILTER OF
THE WORKING PUMP ONLY - LEAVING THE SECOND PUMP CLEAR AND
OPERATIONAL. THIS WILL MAKE THE CRITICALITY 3/IR. IOA AGREES
WITH THIS ANALYSIS AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0112-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA COMBINES ALL DISCONNECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PUMP PACKAGE
INTO ONE FMEA EVALUATED AT THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY. FOR
BETTER CLARITY, EACH DISCONNECT SHOULD BE EVALUATED SEPARATELY.
HOWEVER, SINCE THE NASA FMEA DOES CARRY THE WORST CASE
CRITICALITY, IOA WILL AGREE WITH THE FMEA AND WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N 3 [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA'S RE-EVALUATION OF THE FMEA CRITICALITY HAS RESULTED IN
AGREEMENT WITH IOA. ISSUE IS CLOSED.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




UPON RE-EVALUATION, IOA FEELS THAT THIS FAILURE IS A PART OF NASA
FMEA 06-3-0301-3. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THIS ITEM. IOA CONCURS WITH
THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA DEEMED THIS TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE REQUIRING TWO
SEPARATE FAILURES (06-3-0250-1). UPON RE-EXAMINATION OF
AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
S.K. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA DEEMED THIS TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE REQUIRING TWO
SEPARATE FAILURES (06-3-0250-1). UPON RE-EXAMINATION OF
AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FMEA WAS COVERED BY NASA IN THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE ARS,
NASA FMEA 06-1-0505-1 WITH CRIT 2/IR IS THE EQUIVALENT ITEM.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.














ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE WAS COVERED BY NASA DURING THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE
ARS, NASA FMEA 06-1-0505-2 IS THE EQUIVALENT FAILURE. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK
ROTTER, ON 5/5/88. ANALYSIS HAS SHOWN THAT SUFFICIENT FLOW
CAPACITY EXISTS IN THE OTHER PORTION OF THE LOOP TO COMPENSATE
FOR A COMPLETELY BLOCKED PAYLOAD LOOP. THIS WILL LOWER THE
CRITICALITY TO 2/2. IOA AGREES WITH THIS ANALYSIS AND WITHDRAWS
THE ISSUE.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DURING THE INITIAL ASSESSMENT, IOA ERRONEOUSLY CHANGED THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS ITEM TO A HIGHER THAN REQUIRED VALUE.
ADDITIONAL DATA AND CLOSER EXAMINATION HAVE CONVINCED IOA THAT
THE LOWER CRITICALITY IS MORE APPROPRIATE. IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.




















NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DURING THE INITIAL ASSESSMENT, IOA ERRONEOUSLY CHANGED THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS ITEM TO A HIGHER THAN REQUIRED VALUE.
ADDITIONAL DATA AND CLOSER EXAMINATION HAVE CONVINCED IOA THAT
THE LOWER CRITICALITY IS MORE APPROPRIATE. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.




















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DURING THE INITIAL ASSESSMENT, IOA ERRONEOUSLY CHANGED THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS ITEM TO A HIGHER THAN REQUIRED VALUE.
ADDITIONAL DATA AND CLOSER EXAMINATION HAVE CONVINCED IOA THAT
THE LOWER CRITICALITY IS MORE APPRORRIATE. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DISCUSSION WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK ROTTER ON 5/8/88, HAS
REVEALED SUFFICIENT LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY
TO 3/IR. IOA AGREES WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER'S ANALYSIS AND
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2034-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH 26 (RADIATOR CONTROL LOOP)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE ASSIGNED CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE. (NEW FMEA NO. 05-6WC-I002-I WITH CRIT.
2/2).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA'S RE-EVALUATION OF THE CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS ITEM HAS
REMOVED IT FROM THE CIL BY GIVING IT A NON-CIL RANKING.
THEREFORE, THE ISSUE NO LONGER EXISTS. (NEW FMEA NO. 05-6WC-
1005-1 WITH CRIT 3/IR).





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE NASA FMEAs DO NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN RESTRICTED FREON FLOW
IN THE BODY OF THE EVAPORATOR AND RESTRICTED FREON FLOW IN PLACES
SUCH AS THE ACOD. A RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE ACOD WILL HAVE
NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON EVAPORATOR OPERATIONS AND SHOULD
BE A 3/3 CRITICALITY. HOWEVER, SINCE THE NASA FMEA DOES
CORRECTLY CARRY THE CRITICALITY OF A WORST CASE RESTRICTED FLOW,
MDAC WILL WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.








ITEM: HI LOAD EXIT DUCT









HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK
ROTTER, ON 5/5/88. HANK INDICATES THAT EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF
STEAM/WATER FROM THE EXIT DUCT OCCURS DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS
AND HAS NO EFFECT. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.








ITEM: HI LOAD NOZZLE







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK
ROTTER, ON 5/5/88. HANK INDICATES THAT EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF
STEAM/WATER FROM THE NOZZLE OCCURS DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND
HAS NO EFFECT. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0323-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA AGREES WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0327-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







TOPPING EVAPORATOR INTEGRAL PULSER/SHUTOFF




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFIFITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA GROUPS ALL FAILURES WHICH RESULT IN A LEAKAGE OF FREON INTO
THE FES CORE INTO ONE FMEA. ALTHOUGH IOA WOULD ORDINARILY
RECOMMEND A SEPARATION OF THE FAILURES, THE NASA FMEA DOES
CORRECTLY CARRY THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA GROUPS ALL FAILURES WHICH RESULT IN A LEAKAGE OF FREON INTO
THE FES CORE INTO ONE FMEA. ALTHOUGH IOA WOULD ORDINARILY
RECOMMEND A SEPARATION OF THE FAILURES, THE ONE NASA FMEA DOES
CORRECTLY CARRY THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0323-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE HIGHER CRITICALITY AND WITHDRAWS
THE ISSUE BASED ON THIS CONSERVATISM.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TOPPING EVAPORATOR ANTI CARRYOVER DEVICE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA GROUPS ALL FMEAs INVOLVING A RESTRICTED FLOW OF FREON INTO
ONE FAILURE. WHEN THE RESTRICTION IS IN THE ACOD, THERE IS NO
AFFECT ON THE EVAPORATOR OR FREON LOOP OPERATION. ALTHOUGH IOA
WOULD ORDINARILY RECOMMEND A SEPARATION OF THE FAILURES, THE
NASA FMEA DOES CORRECTLY CARRY THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY. IOA
ACCEPTS THIS APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA GROUPS ALL FAILURES CAUSED BY A MIXING OF FREON AND WATER
INTO ONE FMEA. WHEN THE MIXING OCCURS IN THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR,
THE RESULT IS A LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP AND THE TOPPING
EVAPORATOR. THIS IS A SURVIVABLE ENTRY CONDITION. MIXING OF
WATER AND FREON IN THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR WOULD BE A i/i
CONDITION. ALTHOUGH IOA WOULD ORDINARILY RECOMMEND A SEPARATION
OF THE FAILURES, THE NASA FMEA DOES CORRECTLY CARRY THE WORST
CASE CRITICALITY. IOA WILL, THEREFORE, WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA GROUPS ALL FAILURES CAUSED BY A MIXING OF FREON AND WATER
INTO ONE FMEA. WHEN THE MIXING OCCURS IN THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR,
THE RESULT IS A LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP AND THE TOPPING
EVAPORATOR. THIS IS A SURVIVABLE ENTRY CONDITION. ALTHOUGH IOA
WOULD ORDINARILY RECOMMEND A SEPARATION OF THE FAILURES, THE NASA
FMEA DOES CORRECTLY CARRY THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY. IOA WILL,
THEREFORE, WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0327-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TOPPING EVAPORATOR EXIT DUCT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITY. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0327-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







TOPPING EVAPORATOR - EXIT DUCT - ZONE D, E, F,
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITY.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0327-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3057
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - EXIT DUCT - ZONE D, E, F,
AND H THERMOSTATS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0313-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TOPPING EVAPORATOR- RH AND LH SONIC NOZZLES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
ACCEPTS THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3067
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE A/B FROM WATER SUPPLY TO
WATER/VALVE NOZZLE ASSEMBLIES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK
ROTTER, ON 5/5/88. THE ISSUES RAISED BY MDAC WILL BE USED BY THE
SSM TO PUSH FOR A DESIGN CHANGE IN THE SYSTEM. HOWEVER, LEVEL II
DIRECTION HAS DICTATED THAT THE CRITICALITY REMAIN A 3/IR.
BASED ON THIS DATA, MDAC WILL WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FES FEEDLINE ACCUMULATORSTATUS MONITOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS IOA CONCURS WITH THE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND ACCEPTS THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
MDAC





NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2028-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FES CONTROLLER - SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SSM, HANK ROTTER, ON 5/5/88
WHO AGREED, IN THEORY WITH THE MDAC CRITICALITIES OF 2/IR.
HOWEVER, LEVEL II DIRECTION HAS DICTATED THAT THE FAILURE REMAIN
AT THE CURRENT CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, MDAC WILL WITHDRAW THE
ISSUE. (NEW FMEA NO. 05-6WE-I002-3).
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SSM, HANK ROTTER, ON 5/5/88
WHO AGREED, IN THEORY WITH THE MDAC CRITICALITIES OF 2/IR.
HOWEVER, LEVEL II DIRECTION HAS DICTATED THAT THE FAILURE REMAIN
AT THE CURRENT CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, MDAC WILL WITHDRAWN THE
ISSUE. (NEW FMEA NO. 05-6WE-I002-3, CRIT 3/IR).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2052-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




RE-EVALUATION OF THIS FMEA BY NASA RESULTED IN A MODIFIED
CRITICALITY. ISSUE HAS BEEN RESOLVED. (NEW FMEA NO. O5-6WE-
2001-1, WITH CRIT 2/2).

















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




[ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IN ORDER FOR THE PREMATURE OPERATION OF THE CONTROLLER TO OCCUR,
A SECOND FAILURE MUST HAPPEN. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE. (NOTES
BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER).














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

















FLOW CONTROL VALVE (N.O.)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITY. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0408-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TANK ISOLATION VALVE (N.C.)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SSM, HANK ROTTER, ON 5/5/88.
THE DESIGN OF THE VALVE IS SUCH THAT IT CANNOT FAIL OPEN WHEN IT
IS CLOSED TO START, BUT IF OPEN IT CAN FAIL TO CLOSE. THIS
OCCURS ONLY DURING POST LANDING OPERATIONS. THEREFORE, MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ORIGINAL ISSUE AND NASA WILL CHANGE THE FMEA TO A
2/2 CRITICALITY FOR POST LANDING COOLING CONCERNS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2201-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THIS ITEM. IOA AGREES WITH
THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0305-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GSE HEAT EXCHANGER,FLUID CONNECTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THIS ITEM. IOA AGREES WITH
THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0305-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GSE HEAT EXCHANGER, FLUID CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THIS ITEM. IOA AGREES WITH
THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2041-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWI0, ii (FREONSIGNAL CONDITIONER)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA AGREES WITH THIS
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND ACCEPTS THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
MDAC











TANK ISOLATION VALVE (NC)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ORIGINALLY ASSIGNED HIGHER THAN REQUIRED CRITICALITIES OF
THIS FMEA. RE-EVALUATION WILL PUT IOA IN AGREEMENT WITH NASA
CRITICALITIES.









NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







EXTENDED RANGE CREWMEMBER SAFETY TETHER-SMALL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA HAS LUMPED THE FAILURE TO CLOSE INTO THE "HOOK BREAKS
OR JAMS OPEN" FAILURE. NASA, THEREFORE, UTILIZES A MORE
CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FAILURE AND FUNCTION DURING THEIR
ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS
THE ISSUE.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE IS UNDER NASA FMEA FAILURE "EITHER HOOK LATCH JAMS
OPEN". NASA, THEREFORE, UTILIZES A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION
OF FAILURE AND FUNCTION DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.














3-POINT LATCH TOOL HOOK




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE )




UPON RE-EXAMINATION OF AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES THAT THIS
FAILURE IS COVERED IMPLICITLY IN THE NASA FMEA PACKAGE. IOA
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.















EVA WINCH AND MOUNTASSEMBLYMOUNTINGPLATE




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ x ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




UPON RE-EXAMINATION OF AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES THAT THIS
FAILURE IS COVERED IMPLICITLY IN THE NASA FMEA PACKAGE. IOA
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: TREADMILL IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY ATTACHMENT FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ p] [ P] [ p] [x] *
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. MDAC CONCURS AND WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: SNATCHBLOCK2B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY HOOK LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA CONCURS AND WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.














MDMOF4, OAI, OA2, OA3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:






HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA iii WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C iii AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-305X. THESE MDM's PROCESS/ROUTE
CRITICAL APU STATUS DATA. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FALSELY INDICATING A
HEATER STUCK ON COULD PROMPT MANUAL SHUTDOWN OF AN APU,
REQURING ABORT. FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE FAILED MDM CHANNEL COULD
NOT BE DETECTED. NOTE: NASA FMEA WRITEUP IS INCONSISTENT WITH
2/2 CRIT AND ASSIGNS SCREENS FOR THAT 2/2 CRIT.
CIL ISSUE RESOLUTION:
A. ACCEPT NASA'S CRITICALITY PER IOA GROUNDRULES. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA 116 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 116 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-306X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS, MDM
OF3 HANDLES CRITICAL FUEL CELL MEASUREMENTS FOR WHICH THERE IS NO
REDUNDANT PATH (SE IOA 306X). LOSS OF THESE MEASUREMENTS
WOULD REQUIRE MISSION TERMINATION.
CIL ISSUE RESOLUTION:
A. MDM'S ASSESSED BY DPS. NO CIL ISSUES ON OFI,OF2 OR OF3 MDM'S.
NOT CARRIED BECAUSE FUEL CELL SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS SHOWED THAT
REDUNDANCY FOR ALL MEASUREMENTS EXIST. MCR PRESENTED TO RE-
CHANNEL EACH FUEL CELL TO DIFFERENT MDM. MCR NOT APPROVED. DPS
HAS NOT WRITTEN FMEA YET. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA 117 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 117 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-307X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS, MDM
OF3 HANDLES CRITICAL FUEL CELL MEASUREMENTS FOR WHICH THERE IS NO
REDUNDANT PATH (SE IOA 307X). ERRONEOUS MEASUREMENTS
COULD CAUSE IMPROPER MANUAL SHUTDOWN OF A FUEL CELL, REQUIRING
UNNECESSARY MISSION TERMINATION.
CIL ISSUE RESOLUTION:
A. MDM'S ASSESSED BY DPS. NO CIL ISSUES ON OF1, OF2, OR OF3
MDMS. NOT CARRIED BECAUSE FUEL CELL SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS REVEALED
THAT REDUNDANCY FOR ALL MEASUREMENTS EXIST. MCR PRESENTED TO RE-
CHANNEL EACH FUEL CELL TO DIFFERENT MDMS. MCR NOT APPROVED.
DPS HAS NOT WRITTEN THE FMEA YET. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA 118 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 118 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS INSTR-308X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS SYSTEM
MDM's OF1 AND OF2 HANDLE CRITICAL FUEL CELL DELTA VOLTAGE
MEASUREMENTS (SEE IOA 308). LOSS OF THESE MEASUREMENTS WOULD
CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION.
CIL ISSUE RESOLUTION:
A. MDM'S ASSESSED BY DPS. NO CIL ISSUES ON OF1, OF2, OR OF3
MDMS. NOT CARRIED BECAUSE FUEL CELL SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS REVEALED
THAT REDUNDANCY FOR ALL MEASUREMENTS EXIST. MCR PRESENTED TO RE-
CHANNEL EACH FUEL CELL TO DIFFERENT MDMS. MCR NOT APPROVED.
DPS HAS NOT WRITTEN THE FMEA YET. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.












LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA 119 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 119 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS INSTR-309X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS SYSTEM MDMs
OF1 AND OF2 HANDLE CRITICAL FUEL CELL DELTA VOLTAGE MEASUREMENTS
(SEE IOA 309). ERRONEOUS MDM OUTPUT COULD CAUSE A FALSE
INDICATION OF FUEL CELL MALFUNCTION AND COULD PROMPT A MANUAL
FUEL CELL SHUT DOWN THAT COULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS.
CIL ISSUE RESOLUTION:
A. MDM'S ASSESSED BY DPS. NO CIL ISSUES ON OF1, OF2, OR OF3
MDMS. NOT CARRIED BECAUSE FUEL CELL SUBSYSTEM FEELS THAT
REDUNDANCY FOR ALL MEASUREMENTS EXIST. MCR PRESENTED TO RE-
CHANNEL EACH FUEL CELL TO DIFFERENT MDMS. MCR NOT APPROVED. DPS
HAS NOT WRITTEN THE FMEA YET. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA,
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD "COUPLED WITH AND UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)," WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM". IOA DID NOT CONSIDER DEGRADED STATE VECTORS.
IOA DOES NOT BELIEVE THE LOSS OF TWO STATE VECTORS WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE. IN THE WORST CASE ON ENTRY, THE LOSS OF
THE SECOND STATE VECTOR WILL PERMIT THE ORBITER TO FLY WITH ONE
REMAINING STATE VECTOR.
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL. NASA/RI DOWNGRADED FMEA 05-5-
B03-2-I FROM 2/IR TO 3/IR. THIS REVISED CRITICALITY AGREES WITH
IOA CRITICALITY.














NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:








[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE MODE "LOSS OF OUTPUT TO LRU" IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT:
FAILED MDM PORT - SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O
CARD/CHANNEL FAILURE".
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AND UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM". IOA DID NOT CONSIDER DEGRADED STATE VECTORS.
IOA DOES NOT BELIEVE THE LOSS OF TWO STATE VECTORS WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE. IN THE WORST CASE ON ENTRY, THE LOSS OF
THE SECOND STATE VECTOR WILL PERMIT THE ORBITER TO FLY WITH ONE
REMAINING STATE VECTOR.
IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL. NASA/RI DOWNGRADED FMEA 05-5-
B03-2-I FROM 2/IR TO 3/IR. THIS REVISED CRITICALITY AGREES WITH
IOA CRITICALITY.




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MODE "FALSELY STUCK ON BUSY MODE" IS CONSIDERED TO
BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT:
FAILED MDM PORT - SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O
CARD/CHANNEL FAILURE".
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THE NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AN UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM". IOA DID NOT CONSIDER DEGRADED STATE VECTORS.
IOA DOES NOT BELIEVE THE LOSS OF TWO STATE VECTORS WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE. IN THE WORST CASE ON ENTRY, THE LOSS OF
THE SECOND STATE VECTOR WILL PERMIT THE ORBITER TO FLY WITH ONE
REMAINING STATE VECTOR.
IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL. NASA/RI DOWNGRADED FMEA 05-5-
B03-2-I FROM 2/IR TO 3/IR. THIS REVISED CRITICALITY AGREES WITH
IOA CRITICALITY.




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AN UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM".
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL.
THE IOA WITHDRAWS CRITICALITY DIFFERENCE AND DIFFERENT
APPLICATIONS OF NSTS 22206 AS ASSESSMENT ISSUES SINCE THEY RESULT
IN A MORE CONSERVATIVE NASA/RI EVALUATION OF THE FAILURE MODE
THAN THE IOA ANALYSIS.




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT TO LRU" IS CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED
BY THE ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT: FAILED MDM
PORT - SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O CARD/CHANNEL
FAILURE".
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AN UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM".
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.IOA
DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE. IOA
RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL.
THE IOA WITHDRAWS CRITICALITY DIFFERENCE AND DIFFERENT
APPLICATIONS OF NSTS 22206 AS ASSESSMENT ISSUES SINCE THEY RESULT
IN A MORE CONSERVATIVE NASA/RI EVALUATION OF THE FAILURE MODE
THAN THE IOA ANALYSIS.




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE "FALSELY STUCK ON BUSY MODE" IS CONSIDERED TO
BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT:
FAILED MDM PORT-SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O
CARD/CHANNEL FAILURE".
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AN UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM."
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
THE IOA WITHDRAWS CRITICALITY DIFFERENCE AND DIFFERENT
APPLICATIONS OF NSTS 22206 AS ASSESSMENT ISSUES SINCE THEY RESULT
IN A MORE CONSERVATIVE NASA/RI EVALUATION OF THE FAILURE MODE
THAN THE IOA ANALYSIS.










NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0109-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE MODE MAY BE CLARIFIED TO REFER TO EITHER IST OR 2ND
STAGES OF THE REGULATOR. AFTER FURTHER REVIEW AND REMOVAL OF THE
AUXILIARY 02 TANK, IOA WOULD HAVE RECOMMENDED 3/IR CRITICALITY.
COMPARED TO THIS RECOMMENDATION NASA UTILIZED A MORE
CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR
ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES
WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.











RELIEF VALVE, 1250 PSIG.




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER FURTHER REVIEW AND REMOVAL OF THE AUXILIARY 02 TANK, THE
IOA CRITICALITY WAS CHANGED TO 3/IR. NASA UTILIZED A MORE
CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR
ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES
WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.











RELIEF VALVE, 1250 PSIG.




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER REMOVAL OF THE AUXILIARY 02 TANK, THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS
CHANGED TO 3/IR. NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF
FUNCTION AND REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER
CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0111-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CROSSOVERVALVE-LV3 AND LV4 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0111-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CROSSOVER VALVE-LV3 AND LV4 (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.











SWITCH-S15 AND S18 (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RE-EVALUATION OF THE FAILURE BY NASA HAS RESULTED IN A DIFFERENT
FMEA NUMBER (05-6UC-201-02) AND A REVISED CRITICALITY (3/3) WHICH
NOW AGREES WITH MDAC. ISSUE IS CLOSED.











SWITCH-S15 AND S18 (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FMEA WAS RE-EVALUATED BY NASA AND ASSIGNED A CRITICALITY
(2/1R) WHICH AGREES WITH IOAs ASSESSMENT. ISSUE IS CLOSED.
NASA FMEA NO. 05-6UC-201-I).
(NEW





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0116-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







ORIFICE-(ONE 20 LBM/HR IN LOOP1, TWO i0 LBM/HR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.











LEH 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.











RELIEF VALVE-245 PSIG (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.








ITEM: FILTER-10 MICRONS (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHELAN, ON 23 MAY 1988,
REVEAL THAT THIS FILTER WAS COVERED AS A PART OF THE CHECK VALVE.
(FMEA NO. 06-IC-0123-I, CRITICALITY 2/IR PFP). IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1501-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LEH 02 SHUTOFF VALVE/CREW + PASSENGER (8)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]





NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
164
LEH 02 SHUTOFF VALVE/CREW + PASSENGER (8)
M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHELAN, ON 23 MAY 1988,
REVEALED THE EXISTENCE OF AN ADDITIONAL PIECE OF EQUIPMENT, A "Y"
CONNECTION FOR THE LEH QUICK DISCONNECTS. THIS MEANS THAT THERE
WILL ALWAYS BE AT LEAST ONE MORE OUTLET THAN CREW MEMBERS AND
THE CRITICALITY CAN BE REDUCED TO A IR/2. IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]









[ P ] [ NA]











[ x ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHELAN, ON 23 MAY 1988,
REVEALED THE EXISTENCE OF AN ADDITIONAL PIECE OF EQUIPMENT, A "Y"
CONNECTION FOR THE LEH QUICK DISCONNECTS. THIS MEANS THAT THERE
WILL ALWAYS BE AT LEAST ONE MORE OUTLET THAN CREW MEMBERS AND
THE CRITICALITY CAN BE REDUCED TO A IR/2. IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHELAN, ON 23 MAY 1988,
REVEALED THE EXISTENCE OF AN ADDITIONAL PIECE OF EQUIPMENT, A "Y"
CONNECTION FOR THE LEH QUICK DISCONNECTS. THIS MEANS THAT THERE
WILL ALWAYS BE AT LEAST ONE MORE OUTLET THAN CREW MEMBERS AND
THE CRITICALITY CAN BE REDUCED TO A IR/2. IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1512-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SHUTOFF VALVE/DIRECT OXYGEN (I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ I /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHALAN, ON 23
MAY 1988. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE LEAK TO GO THROUGH THE VALVE
AND THRU THE DIRECT OXYGEN OUTLET INTO THE CABIN. THERE IS A
FLOW RESTRICTER WHICH LIMITS THE LEAK TO 10LBS/HR. AT THIS
LEVEL, THE LEHS WILL STILL PROVIDE OXYGEN TO THE CREW AND NO
IMMEDIATE LOSS OF LIFE OCCURS. GIVEN THIS KNOWLEDGE, IOA
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0161-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 212
ITEM: N2 TANKS (4)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF Ii0 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN 23 MAY 1988,
IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0191-1
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]






LINES & FITTINGS - TP27 & TP28
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RE-EVALUATION OF SYSTEM AND CONTROLS WILL PERMIT IOA TO AGREE
WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN.























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF ii0 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0231-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 232
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MMU CAN NOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE MISSION CRITICAL. THEREFORE, IOA
WILL AGREE WITH NASAs LOWER CRITICALITIES AND WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0165-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






N2 SYSTEM SUPPLY ISOL. VLV-LV3&LV4 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR _ [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF ii0 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0165-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






N2 SYSTEMSUPPLY ISOL. VLV-LV3&LV4 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] E ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF ll0 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0165-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SINGLE PHASEMOTOR/N2-SYSTEMISOL. VLV (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA STUDIED THE ELECTRICAL MOTOR SEPARATELY FROM THE VALVE, AND
THIS COMPARISON WAS MADE BASED ON THE FMEA ANALYSIS FOR THE
VALVE.
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF ii0 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2013-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, SI3&S21/N2-SYSTEM ISOL VLV (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF ii0 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0152-3
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 271
ITEM: SHUTOFF VALVE (2)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF ii0 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF Ii0 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION REVEALED THAT THE DESIGN OF THIS VALVE IS
SUCH THAT IT IS FLOWN NORMALLY CLOSED. SHOULD A LEAK OCCUR, THE
OPERATING LEG CAN BE CHANGED AND THE LEAK ISOLATED. IT SHOULD
ALSO BE NOTED THAT EVEN WITH A LEAK, N2 IS STILL AVAILABLE TO
THE CABIN ATMOSPHERE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0146-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDACID: 312
ITEM: PPO2 SENSOR-C (I)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




RE-EVALUATION ALLOWS IOA TO AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES.
IS WITHDRAWN.
ISSUE











CABIN PRESSURE SENSOR (I)











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.











CABIN DP/DT SENSOR (i)











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2022-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI6/DP/DT (I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN, NASA, SSM, ON 23 MAY 1988, PLUS
EXAMINATION OF PART DRAWINGS REVEALED THAT THIS FILTERS DESIGN
PRECLUDES THE CREDIBILITY OF RESTRICTED FLOW. IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.











SINGLE PHASE MOTOR (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-200100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB22 & CB34 _2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RE-EVALUATION BY NASA HAS RESULTED IN A DIFFERENT FMEA NUMBER
(05-6UC-90X) AND A MODIFIED CRITICALITY (3/3) WHICH MATCHES IOA'S
RECOMMENDATION. ISSUE CLOSED.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-200100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB22 & CB34 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RE-EVALUATION BY NASA HAS RESULTED IN A DIFFERENT FMEA NUMBER
(05-6UC-100X) AND A MODIFIED CRITICALITY (3/3) WHICH MATCHES
IOA'S RECOMMENDATION. ISSUE CLOSED.




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER RE-EVALUATION, IOA HAS DETERMINED THAT THE FAILURE OF
SCREEN B IS NO LONGER AN ISSUE.








ITEM: DEBRIS SCREEN (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS DEBRIS SCREEN IS COVERED AS A PART OF THE NASA FMEA 06-IC-
0206-1 WHICH IS WRITTEN AGAINST THE VALVE. SINCE THE CRITICALITY
MATCHES IOAs, THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN.




















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR REDUNDANCY
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.




















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR REDUNDANCY
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.


















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR REDUNDANCY
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.











FILTER, I0 MICRON (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE FILTER UNDER THE LINES AND
FITTINGS ANALYSIS. THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FOR THE FILTER ALONE WAS
NOT CONSIDERED CREDIBLE. HOWEVER, BY DEFINING THIS AS A POSSIBLE
FAILURE MODE, NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE
DEFINITION OF FAILURE MODES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.











ORIFICE, DIRECT BLEED (I)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0191-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 3291
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.











RELIEF VALVE, 16 PSIA




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0206-3
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 3611
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-52
SECTION C.9

























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE IS INCORPORATED AS A "CAUSE" IN FMEA 06-3A-0605-2.
ELECTRICAL OPEN OR SHORT CIRCUIT MUST INVOLVE BOTH REDUNDANT
SOLENOID COILS. INDIVIDUAL ELECTRICAL FAILURES ARE COVERED IN
WSB EPDC FMEA.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS BLOCKAGE OF NOZZLE FOR ANY REASON. FREEZING
IMPLIES BOTH HEATERS LOST. SINGLE HEATER FAILURE IS COVERED BY
FMEA 06-3A-0622-I. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HYD/WSB
118
HYDRAULIC/LUBE OIL WATER FILTERS
J. DUVAL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [ P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDED ADDING "OR RESTRICTED FLOW" TO FAILURE MODE
DESCRIPTION OF FMEA 06-3A-0605-2 TO COVER BLOCKAGE OF WATER VALVE
FILTER. SUBSYSTEM MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL ACCEPTED THIS
RECOMMENDATION DURING IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING ON
4/26/88.











LUBE OIL TEMP SENSOR











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA SHOWS SCREEN A=P IN NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW BOARD
PRESENTATION, 3/30/88. IOA ACCEPTS SCREEN PASSED, RATHER THAN
NA, AS THIS DOES NOT AFFECT CIL STATUS OR WAIVER STATUS.
THIS FMEA IS NO LONGER ON THE CIL.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FMEA 06-3-0609-2 DELETED BY NASA. COMBINED WITH 06-3-0609-1.
NASA APPROACH TAKES RUPTURE OF GN2 TANK AS WORST CASE FAILURE
MODE. IOA ACCEPTS THIS APPROACH. NO SEPARATE FMEA FOR LEAKAGE
IS NECESSARY.













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
GN2 REGULATOR VALVE IN SERIES WOULD REGULATE PRESSURE TO H20 TANK
- REQUIRES SECOND FAILURE TO CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY: THIRD FAILURE
IN REDUNDANCY CHAIN IS LOSS OF A SECOND HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM, FOR ANY REASON.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 06-3A-0606-I COVERS FILTER BLOCKAGE AS PART OF GN2
SHUTOFF VALVE FAILURE MODE-FILTER IN QUESTION IS PART OF GN2
SHUTOFF VALVE. IOA ACCEPTS THIS APPROACH.














HYBRID DRIVER CIRCUIT (CONTROLLER)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MODE (FMEA 05-6W-2208-1B) IS 3/IR, PPP BY NASA
BASELINE PRESENTED TO NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW BOARD ON 3/30/88.
IOA CONCURS WITH THIS CRITICALITY-SWITCHING CONTROLLERS WILL
REGAIN GN2 SHUTOFF VALVE CONTROL. SCREEN B IS ACCEPTABLE AS P,
RATHER THAN NA. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT CIL OR WAIVER
STATUS.














PRESS ACTIVATED RELIEF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS VALVE FUNCTION IS NOT REQUIRED UNLESS HYD LINE IS BLOCKED.
IN THAT CASE, LINE BLOCKAGE IS THE CAUSE OF HYDRAULIC LOSS, AND
THE CIRC PUMP IS IRRELEVANT. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DECISION TO
OMIT THIS FAILURE MODE. CRITICALITY WOULD BE 3/3, IF IT WERE
INCLUDED.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE, ACCORDING TO
HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL (IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES
REVIEW MEETING, 4/26/88). IOA CONCURS.





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A02-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY. LOSS OF TWO Q. D.'S ON TWO
HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS STILL ALLOWS RTLS ABORT, IN WORST CASE. FMEA
02-6-A02-I IS I/I BECAUSE ENGINE VALVES DO NOT LOCK UP IN THIS
CASE-UNCONTROLLED FUEL/OXIDIZER MIXTURE CAN LEAD TO SSME
CATASTROPHIC FAILURE. THIS ISSUE WAS WITHDRAWN AS A RESULT OF
MEETING WITH NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL ON 4/26/88.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
HYD/WSB
455
CHECK VALVE-RETURN LINE FROM ENG'S/ACT'S
W. DAVIDSON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY. SECOND FAILURE IS HYD
LINE LEAK UPSTREAM OF VALVE. THIRD FAILURE IS LOSS OF A SECOND
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM, FOR ANY REASON.





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYDRAULIC LINE (SUPPLY) SYSTEM1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LINE RUPTURE IS DETECTIBLE WHEN L. G. ISOL VALVE 1 IS OPENED.
FLIGHT CREW CAN TAKE ACTION TO MANAGE LEAK. THIS IS
JUSTIFICATION FOR PASSING SCREEN B, ACCORDING TO SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL (IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING,
4/26/88).
IOA CONCURS WITH THIS REASONING.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CRITICALITY IS BASED ON WORST CASE CONSEQUENCES OF A
HYDRAULIC LINE RUPTURE. IOA ACCEPTS THIS APPROACH. THERE IS NO
NEED TO CONSIDER SEPARATE FMEA'S FOR LINE SEGMENTS WITH LESS
SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G04-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REDUNDANT SHUTOFF VALVE (N.O.)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA ORIGINAL CRITICALITY WAS BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT
THE PYRO UNLOCK MECHANISM CANNOT OVERRIDE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
LOCKUP. IN ACTUALITY, THERE IS NO HYDRAULIC PRESSURE LOCKUP.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY. SCREEN B IS PASSED,
ACCORDING TO NASA BASELINE DOCUMENTED IN NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW
BOARD PRESENTATION, 3/30/88. IOA CONCURS-REDUNDANCY (PRYO
SYSTEM) IS ACTIVATED BY AUTOMATIC DETECTION AND SWITCHOVER, PER
NSTS-22206, SECTION 2.3.5.a.





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
VALVE LEAK IS DETECTIBLE WHEN L. G. ISOL VALVE 1 IS OPENED.
FLIGHT CREW CAN TAKE ACTION TO MANAGE LEAK. THIS IS
JUSTIFICATION FOR PASSING SCREEN B, ACCORDING TO SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL (IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING,
4/26/88). IOA CONCURS WITH THIS REASONING.





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G13-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LANDING GEAR CONTROL UP/CIRC. SOLENOID VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ORIGINAL IOA CRITICALITY WAS BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT
THE PYRO UNLOCK MECHANISM CANNOT OVERRIDE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
LOCKUP. IN ACTUALITY, THERE IS NO HYDRAULIC PRESSURE LOCKUP.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA 3/IR CRITICALITY. SCREEN B IS PASSED,
ACCORDING TO NASA BASELINE DOCUMENTED IN NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW
BOARD PRESENTATION, 3/30/88. IOA CONCURS; VALVE FAILURE IS
DETECTIBLE AT L. G. ISOL VALVE OPEN, DUE TO CLOSURE OF SHUTTLE
VALVES (ON TELEMETRY). DETECTION AT L. G. ISOL VALVE OPEN IS
SUFFICIENT TO PASS SCREEN B, ACCORDING TO SSM WALLACE TUTHILL
(IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING, 4/26/88).














LANDING GEARCONTROLUP/CIRC. SOLENOID VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA DELETED FMEA 02-6-G13-3. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS DECISION.
THIS VALVE REMAINS CLOSED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE FLIGHT, SO IT
CANNOT FAIL TO CLOSE.





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LANDING GEAR CONTROL UP/CIRC SOLENOID VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
VALVE LEAK IS DETECTIBLE WHEN L. G. ISOL VALVE 1 IS OPENED.
FLIGHT CREW CAN TAKE ACTION TO MANAGE LEAK. THIS IS
JUSTIFICATION FOR PASSING SCREEN B, (ACCORDING TO SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL (IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING,
4/26/88). IOA CONCURS WITH THIS REASONING.





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LANDING GEARCONTROLVALVE - 2 POS, 3 WAY,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
VALVE LEAK IS DETECTIBLE WHEN L. G. ISOL VALVE 1 IS OPENED.
FLIGHT CREW CAN TAKE ACTION TO MANAGE LEAK. THIS IS
JUSTIFICATION FOR PASSING SCREEN B, (ACCORDING TO SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL (IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING,
4/26/88). IOA CONCURS WITH THIS REASONING.




















NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CRITICALITY IS BASED ON POSSIBLITY THAT LOSS OF 2 ACTUATORS
COULD CAUSE E. T. UMBILICAL PLATE TO BECOME MISALIGNED AND FAIL
TO RETRACT PROPERLY, RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. IOA CONCURS.




















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY. SECOND FAILURE IS
HYDRAULIC LEAK UPSTREAM OF CHECK VALVE. THIRD FAILURE IS LOSS OF
ANOTHER HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FOR ANY REASON. IOA CONCURS WITH SCREEN
B INAPPLICABILITY, PER NSTS-22206, SECTION 2.3.4.b.2(b).
SYSTEM IS NOT OPERATIVE DURING ANY NORMAL MISSION PHASE.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE IS COVERED IN ATCS SUBSYSTEM, FMEA 06-3-0301-3.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO CONTROL POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE CIRC PUMP AT
APU START OR DURING APU OPERATION. THIRD FAILURE IS LOSS OF
ANOTHER CIRC PUMP FOR ANY REASON, WHICH CAN LEAD TO LOSS OF
VEHICLE. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER (K3), AR TYPE III




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CIL
ITEM
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVIDE POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT DRIVERS MEANS LOSS OF ONE CIRC PUMP AT APU
START OR DURING APU OPERATION. NEXT FAILURE IS LOSS OF A SECOND
CIRC PUMP FOR ANY REASON, WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AS A
CONSEQUENCE. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER (K4), AR TYPE III
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
[ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVIDE POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT DRIVERS MEANS LOSS OF ONE CIRC PUMP AT APU
START OR DURING APU OPERATION. NEXT FAILURE IS LOSS OF A SECOND
CIRC PUMP FOR ANY REASON, WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AS A
CONSEQUENCE. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-1E
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ASSESSMENT. THIS FAILURE MODE IS NOT A CIL
ITEM IN THE NASA BASELINE AS DOCUMENTED IN THE NSTS LEVEL I/II
REVIEW BOARD PRESENTATION OF 3/30/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2051-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA CRITICALITY FOR THIS FAILURE MODE IS 3/3 AS DOCUMENTED IN
THE NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW BOARD PRESENTATION OF 3/30/88, AND IT
IS NOT LISTED AS A CIL ITEM. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ASSESSMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C06-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







VALVE, CHECK, L.G. HYD. CKT. FUSELAGERETURN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P 3 [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO REDUNDANCY: THIRD FAILURE IS LOSS OF
ANOTHER HYDRAULIC SYSTEM, FOR ANY REASON.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-00100-1B
NASA DATA:







DIODE, HYD MN PUMPDEPRESSVLV SOL CKT.




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE IS INCLUDED IN THE NASA FMEA/CIL BASELINE AS
DOCUMENTED IN THE NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW BOARD PRESENTATION OF
3/30/88, WITH CRITICALITY 3/IR P F P. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
ASSESSMENT.















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ 2 /iR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4-054000-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p] [ F] [ p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ]





















[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR J [ P ] [ F ] [ P J [ X J
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ S ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





















[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ _ [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CI L
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





















[ x ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ ] [ ]











[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] _ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ]





















[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ] ......
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [i/I] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [X]*IX]
COMP_E [ N/N j [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





















[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:






THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
I OA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.












LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[
[
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:







THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





















[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:







THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.












LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [ P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A S C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2015-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.


















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [ F] [ P]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] .
] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. T_E
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.


















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 J [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
E ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
Ix]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [F] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











POWER SUPPLY TEST AMP




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.











POWER SUPPLY TEST AMP











NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /ZR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 13 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE E / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]














[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.


















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOAIMDAC.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 3 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.









LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.


















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.












LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] E p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.












LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOa [ 3 /IR ]









[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[N] [N] [N] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [F] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.












LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ _ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.











ITEM: ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 100-105 (WASHER,
BUSHING, NUT, COTTER PIN, SAFETY WIRE, ETC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.















NEW [ X ]




NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ x] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2501
SEALS, WINDOW PANE ASSEMBLY
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2502
SEALS, WINDOW ASSEMBLY SPACER/RETAINER
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2503
SEALS, WINDOW ASSEMBLY INSTALLATION
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[F] [F] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2504
SEALS, MANUFACTURING ACCESS PANEL
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2505
SEAL, FEED THROUGH PLATES, BULKHEADS
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2506
SEAL ELECTRICAL FEEDTHROUGH CONNECTOR
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
01-4-CS18-I
2507
SEALS, HARD LINE FEED THROUGH FITTING
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.










NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: 01-4-CS19-I
MDAC ID: 2508
ITEM: SEALS, CREW MODULE, ETS FEEDTHOUGH BLANKING
PLUGS (OV-102 ONLY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.














MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2509
SEALS, AIRLOCK HATCH "A" AND "B" WINDOWS
LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2510
SEALS, INNER PANES, SIDE HATCH WINDOW
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] E ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
01-4-CS24-I
2511
SEAL, SIDE HATCH WINDOW ASSEMBLY
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2512
SEALS, AIRLOCK AND INGRESS/EGRESS HATCHES
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
[N] [N] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ x ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2513
SEALS, TUNNEL/CREW MODULE STRUCTURAL INTERFACE
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2514
SEALS, SIDE HATCH TUNNEL SEPARATION PLANE
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] C ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2515
SEALS, AIRLOCK TO BULKHEAD STRUCTURAL INTERFACE
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, I0A HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2516
SEAL, BULKHEAD FEED THROUGH, WCCS LINES
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
C ] [ ] C ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2517
SEAL, LATCH ACTUATOR TO HATCH STRUCTURE
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2518
SEAL, CREW MODULE, ETS PYRO LINE FITTINGS
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











OVERHEAD PANEL (OV-102 ONLY)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2519
SEAL, CREW MODULE, FLIGHT DECK "BEANIE CAP"




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.










NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2520
ITEM: SEALS, STAR TRACKER BOOM COLLAR STRUCTURAL
ATTACH AND COVER PLATE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2521
SEAL, STAR TRACKER BOOM
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2522
SEAL, STAR TRACKER WELL TO CREW MODULE STRUCTURE
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.










NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2523
ITEM: SEAL, AFT BULKHEAD-POSITIVE PRESSURE RELIEF
VALVES, BLEED VALVES & LEFT HAND SIDE-NEGATIVE PRESSURE RELIEF
VALVES.




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2524
SEAL, VENT SEVERANCE PANEL
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]




MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2525
SEALS, SIDE HATCH CABIN FILL TEST PORT
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] C ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.










NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2526
ITEM: SEAL, AIR EQUALIZATION VALVES AND PRESSURE GAUGE
TO HATCH STRUCTURE, AIRLOCK HATCHES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2527
SEAL, AFT BULKHEAD-VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2528
SEAL, TEST PORT CAP, CABIN FILL, SIDE HATCH
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.














MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2529
SEAL, FEED THROUGH PLATE, AIRLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
2700
DEBRIS CONTAINER, AFT ATTACH
R. O'DONNELL
NASA [ i /1 ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
2701
DEBRIS CONTAINER, UMBILICAL SEPARATION SYSTEM
R. O'DONNELL
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.





NASA FMEA #: 02-3A-F4-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SPHERICAL BEARING, ORBITER/ET FORWARD ATTACH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.




















NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.














NASA [ 1 /I ] [
IOA [ / ] [
















] [ ] [ ] [x]*
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.






NASA FMEA #: 02-3A-A7-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HOLE PLUGGER/COVER ASSY, ORBITER/ET AFT ATTACH
LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.





NASA FMEA #: 02-3A-U6-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ i /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
2707
ELECTRICAL DISCONNECT ASSEMBLY, UMBILICAL
R. O'DONNELL
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.





NASA FMEA #: 02-3A-US-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ELECTRICAL DISCONNECT ASSEMBLY, UMBILICAL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
2709




[ P ] [ F ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

















CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

















CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
J. BACHER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CLUTCH











NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] _ [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [
[ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] *
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

















READY TO LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
J. BACHER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3512
ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERENO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
J. BACHER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]








[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ]







MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

















MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
J. BACHER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

















CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMEMTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMEMTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3527
FUSE, IA, TO ACTUATOR STATUS SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







RESISTOR, 1.2K, TO MCA LOGIC SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3529
RESISTOR, 1.2K, TO MCA LOGIC SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_ [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]






INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 2) ACTUATOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (Sl & 2) ACTUATOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES (S5 & 6)
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES (S5 & 6)
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 4101 - 4112




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




IOA/AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.




ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-45 i0


















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
F LIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A S C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]

























[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /iR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELES)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
ZOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ _ [ x ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-341
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE : 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4527


















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.




















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / J [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ P ] [ P ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /_ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

















CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IS GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.


















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.


















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMIANING ISSUES BY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.









LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NO
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINIG ISSUES MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUES IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /!R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.




















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [ F] [ p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.









LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.


















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
E ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]













[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ J C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FME/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ _ /_ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ _ [ ] [ _ [ J
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]








COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i-
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[_] CN] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











40 MS TIME DELAY







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











40 MS TIME DELAY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.























NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











4 SECOND TIME DELAY







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











40 MS TIME DELAY









HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











4 SECOND TIME DELAY









HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOa [ S /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4653





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CI L
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE MOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] E ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD OPEN LIMIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD OPEN LIMIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD CLOSED LIMIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















PAYLOADBAY DOORDRIVE SUPPORTBEARING ASSEMBLY
J. BACHER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











NASA [ / ]






PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [p]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

















PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 88 DEGREES LIMIT SWITCH
J. BACHER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 88 DEGREES LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ J [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














PAYLOAD BAY DOOR ALIGNMENT ROLLER GUIDE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.












LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5506
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MECHANICAL POWER SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [p] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE _'
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.


















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]






[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETAION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W











NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














PAYLOAD BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY




HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
NASA [ / ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














PAYLOAD BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]












[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.


















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.




ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6 i05











NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] E ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














LIMIT SWITCHES, RELEASE (Sl),




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











LIMIT SWITCHES, LATCH (S2),




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]









COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.


















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














LIMIT SWITCHES, DEPLOY (SI, $2, $4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














LIMIT SWITCHES, STOW(SI, $2, $3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ J [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.













HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.




















NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
A.D. MONTGOMERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
A.D. MONTGOMERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]













[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWNON MDAC ID 8100 - 8108




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














MCA PURGE SIGNAL DRIVER




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.











MCA DC POWER BUS







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














MCA AC POWER BUS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














OPEN LIMIT SWITCHES (Sl & 3) ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASSA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (Sl & 3) ACTUATOR
H.J. LOWERY
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($2 & 4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.














DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES (S2 & 4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [






THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.















LEAD ANALYST : H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

















ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9100-9107
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
















ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWNON MDAC ID 9500
H.J. LOWERY
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. i0-572


